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CHRONOLOGY
August, 1822 .................. Andrew Jackson is nominated for the

presidency of the United States by the
Tennessee Legislature.
November, 1822 . . . . . . . . . Henry Clay is nominated for the presi
dency of the United States by the Ken
tucky Legislature.
January, 1823

. . . . . . . . . John Quincy Adams is nominated for the
presidency of the United States by a
Massachusetts convention, and states his
attitude toward political bargaining
to gain office in the "Macbeth Policy."

September, 1823

. . . . . . . . William H. Crawford suffers a paralytic
stroke.

November, 1823 . . . . . . . . .

John C. Calhoun is nominated for the

presidency of the United States by a
congressional caucus.
February, I82J4. . . . . . . . . . William H. Crawford is nominated for the
presidency of the United States by a con
gressional caucus.
December 12, I82U

. . . . . . . Robert P. Letcher discusses "politics**
with John Quincy Adams at Henry Clay's
boarding house.

December 15, I82U

. . . . . . . Edward Vfyer tells John Quincy Adams that
Henry Clay will support Adams if he can
"serve himself."

December 16, I82I4. . . . . . . . Arrival of Louisiana voting returns
eliminates Clay from consideration by
the House of Representatives.
December 17, 1821; . . . . . . . Letcher confers with Adams at the State
Department.
December 23, I82U
January 1, l82u

. . . . . . . Adams concludes that Letcher is "moving
for Clay."
. . . . . . . . Letcher suggests an Adams-Clay meeting.
iv

January 9, 1825

Clay and Adams meet at Adams' home.

January 25, 1825 . . . . . . .

Clay publicly announces his intention
of supporting Adams in the House elec
tion. George Kremer's letter accusing
Clay and Adams of corruption appears in
the Columbian Observer.

February 3, 1825 . . . . . . .

Clay demands a House investigation of
Kremer's accusation.

February 9, 1825

Adams is elected president by the House
of Representatives.

.......

February 10, 1,825 . . . . . . .

Adams announces that he will appoint Clay
secretary of state.

March U, 1825 . . . . . . . . .

Adams is inaugurated president.

March 7, 1962 . . . . . . . . .

Clay's nomination is approved by the
Senate.

December 10, 1838 . . . . . . .

Albert H. Tracy requests Adams to give
him information concerning the election
of 182U.

INTRODUCTION
The ten years from the end of the War of 1812 to the election of
I82U has been generally designated by both contemporary observers and
later historians as "The Sra of Good Feeling" because of the decline of
political and sectional conflicts which characterized the period.
In spite of the general acceptance of the term, there seems to be
some difference of opinion among historians over its origin. According
to Louis Go Hatch, the phrase first appeared during a debate in the House
of Representatives as "The Era of Good Feeling" in reference to the
absence of political rancor in that body,^ but he makes no attempt to
date the event.

In opposition to this point of view, Eugene H, Roseboom

maintains that the term was first used by the Boston Centinel to describe
President Monroe’s visit to New England early in his first term.^ What
ever the origin, the use cf the term soon became widespread to designate
a period "which came to be viewed in retrospect as a golden age of
patriotism and moderation."3
According to the traditional historical view of the period, the
tranquility of the era had two basic causes; first, the wave of national
istic feeling which swept over the country in the wake of the American
victory in the War of I8l2; and second, the gradual decline and disappear^L. C. Hatch, A History of the Vice-presidency of the United
States (New York, 193UTj P- 153.
2

E. H. Roseboom,
1927), p. 72.

A History of Presidential Elections (New York.
~
---

%atch, o£. cit., p. l23o
1

ance of the Federalist party, which left the Republicans in complete con
trol of the political field and which made inter-party conflict iitç)ossible.
The decline of the Federalist party had begun with the Alien and
Sedition acts and the dispute between Alexander Hamilton and John Adams
over foreign policy,

Hamilton himself apparently foresaw the eventual

demise of the party as early as 1802, for in April of that year, in a
letter to James A, Bayard of Delaware, he outlined a new ""front" organi
zation which was designed to revive the fallen fortunes of the dying
party.

Before and during the War of 1812 the Federalist party underwent

a brief revival during the dispute over the non-intercourse policy,^
But the failure of the party members to support the war effort attached
an irremovable stigma of treason to the Federalists,^
Coupled with this stigma of treason, and contributing perhaps
even more to the ever-decreasing influence of the Federalist party, was
their obvious distrust of democracy. They felt that the popular and
triumphant Jeffersonians were confusing equality with crass mediocrity.
In direct opposition to prevalent public opinion, these Federalists advo
cated "qualified™ as opposed to "whole hog" democracy,&
Many historians feel that one of the most important causes of
this wave of democratic feeling which was sweeping the country — and
incidentally contributing to the ultimate destruction of the Federalist
\latch, 0£, cit., p, 1$3,
E. Binkley, Ameilcan Political Parties - Their Natural
History (New York, 19U3), p. 97.
Marcus Cunliffe, The Nation Takes Shape, (Chicago, 1959),
pp. 178-9.

party — was the growing importance and influence of the west. By 1820
six new western states had been admitted to the Union, and the census of
that year indicated that 32 per cent of the population lived in that
region and elected U? of 213 Representatives and 18 of U8 Senators,
And, what was perhaps more inçjortant, this growing influence of
the west on the political affairs of the nation was a democratizing influ
ence, for in all but one of the new states the right to vote had been
extended to all adult white males,7 and this encouraged the older, eastern
states to adopt universal suffrage in an attenqpt to discourage the tide
of westward migration.®
Economic conditions also encouraged the spread of democracy dur
ing a period in which the country underwent a radical and sweeping evo
lution from a rural, colonial, handicraft economy to an industrial nation.
New methods of transportation, coupled with an expanding suffrage, pro
vided an entirely new political environment for the voters.^ Increased
suffrage resulted in the emergence of labor as a political f o r c e . T h e
depression of 1819, encouraging class conflict for the first time since
the Jeffersonian era, made these newly-enfranchised Americans conscious
of the fact that politics had an intimate relation to their welfare.
Allen Johnson, Union and Democracy (New York, 1915), p. 303.
O
Binkley,
cit., p. 100.
o
John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United
States (New York, 1900), p.
10
0. G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era (New York, 1959), p. 10.
■Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the
Men Who Made It (New York, 1 9 5 ^ pp. 50-51.
~

To some historians^ this popular unrest based on economic frus
trations was not confined to workingmen, but also felt by such "vigorous
classes" as southern planters and small farmers in the north and west
who believed the central government to be hostile to their needs and
interests.other historians agree that the economic changes of the
period encouraged democracy, but a democracy which was "greedy, intol^
erant, imperialistic, and lawless,® and which transformed "Liberty® into
"laissez faire.”

According to this view, the new democracy gave rise

to a concept of earned wealth which extolled the virtues of the self-made
man as superior to the hereditary rich, and which utilized agrarian terms
in the economic battle of entrepreneur against capitalist, banker against
regulation, and Wall Street against Chestnut.^ The driving force behind
the expanding democracy, this interpretation continues, was “the selfemployed entrepreneurs® who were struggling for a more important and prof
itable place in the economy, against the older “elite group® of business
men who were more conservative politically.^^ Even in the west economic
conditions were seen by some as basic to the demands of the frontiersman
for political power.

Individual ownership of land and the sense of pro

prietorship felt by the westerner encouraged individuality, self-reliance,
12

A. M. Schlesinger Jr., The. Age of Jackson (Boston, 19U5), p. 30.

^%ray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America (Princeton, 1957),
p. 327.

^Ibid., pp. 328-9c
15Van Deusen, 0£. cit., pp. 11=12.

and a belief in complete social equality which tended to encourage democ
racy.^^
Among the other factors which have been considered as possible
causes of the rise of democracy during this period, Glyndon Van Deusen
lists the after-effects of the political idealism of the American Revolu
tion, the logical development of the Jeffersonian ideal of a wide popular
support for government, and the practicing politician's realization that
advocacy of the expansion of the suffrage would result in the support of
that advocate by the newly-enfranchised masses.^?
Whatever the reason or reasons for the extension of the suffrage.
Federalism seemed to have no place in the growing democracy of the period.
The stricken party finally stopped breathing in 1820, when it failed to
present a ticket,
*

-ît

-s-

Although the Federalist party had died, its traditions remained
very much alive.

Most Federalists apparently found their way into the

swelling ranks of the Republican party, where their influence modified
that party's agrarianism to correspond more closely with a pro-business
viewpoint.^® This ‘Tederalising'" of the Republican party had begun when
the pressures of the War of I8l2 had caused the Madison administration
to adopt many Federalist principles.

During Monroe's first term, all but

irreconcilable Federalists had moved over into the Republic column, where
TA
Johnson, 0£, cit., p. 300.
^^Van Deusen, o£. cit., pp. 11=12.
Ï^Binkley, op. cit., p. 98.

they “gave the economic program of Hamilton a kindlier aspect and a more
ingratiating vocabulaiy»“^9
The members of the old Federalist party who joined the Republic
ranks united behind Henry Clay. Those die-hards who could not bring them
selves to join the Republicans could be found marching behind the banner
of Daniel Webster, who “was at once recognized as the chief and head of
all that remained of the great

p

a

r

t

y

.

of the latter, or “irrecon

cilable “ group, some took refuge in the courts, which John Marshall “pro
posed to make an impregnable fortress,* and in the churches, where they
mobilized religion to “hedge the aristocracy of wealth with divinity.
Some, of course, retired from politics.
With only one political party in the field, there could be no
party conflict as such.

But can the period really be considered an “Era

of Good Feeling* for this reason alone? Some historians indicate that
while it might have been justly called a “unique period of one-party
government,“22 an “abnormality,“23 an “armistice,“2L or even “a busy

regrouping of old forces and old passions under new names,“2^ it was
^Schlesinger, og. cit., p. 11.
^^enry Cabot Lodge, Daniel Webster (Boston, 1893), p. 131.
^^Schlesinger, og. cit., pp. 15=16.
22

Samuel F. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York,
-------------------------19?6), p. 11.
^&oseboom, og. cit., p. 76.
^Vrederick J. Turner, The Rise of the New West (New York,
1906), p. 172.--------------- — -----------------25
G. G. Van Deusen, Thurlcw Weed§ Wizard of the Lobby (Boston
19U7), p. 23.

—

----------------

scarcely an «Era of Good Feeling." In fact, according to these views, a
better name could be the "Era of Bad Feeling," when bitter personal, sec
tional, and local struggles temporarily replaced national party warfare.
Those who share this view of the period see it as a "crazy quilt of dis
harmonies and contradictions"
and personal bickering.

in which there was constant political

In fact, one eminent critic, Frederick J. Turner,

states 8
The reader who has followed the evidences of a factional con
troversy among the rival presidential candidates in the cabinet,
and noted the wide-spread distress following the panic of I8l9,
the growing sectional jealousies, the first skirmishes in the
slavery struggle and the clamor of a democracy eager to assert
its control and profoundly distrustful of the reigning political
powers will question the reality of this good feeling.2?
But, in addition to the diametrically-opposed views of the tradi
tionalists who see the period as an "Era of Good Feelings" because of
the lack of party conflict, and the later historians, who feel that it
was really an "Era of Baa Feelings" because of the political animosity
exhibited on the state, local, and personal levels, there is still a
third view. The latter interprets the period as an "Era of Good Feel
ings" not despite, but because of the factionalisms, animosities, and
hatreds which characterize it. Morton Borden, one exponent of this
third view, sees a "strong, bouyant, . . . optimistic, . . . proud and
prosperous America" as resting “in a trough tf picayune local disagree
ments" because there were no grave national issues to divide the people

Cunliffe,

cit., p. 157.

"^Turner, :-p. cit., p. 265.

8
as there had been before the War of 1012, and as there later were during
the 1820»s and

1 8 3 0 ' s .

In the midst of the bitter animosities and personal hatreds, and
in strange contrast with the feverish activity going on around him, sat
James Monroe, “patient . . . dispassionate . . . HwitF] candor, fairmindedness, and magnanimity . . . attributed to him even by those who
29

were engaged in bitter rivalry. ^

His poise, patience, and dignity,

rather than acting to quiet the bickering and discord around him, seemed
instead to encourage it. Since he was not a dynamic or inspiring leader,
sincq there was no sense of party allegiance to hinr,30 and since he
seemed to be unable to create and insist upon a definite policy,31 his
second term soon degenerated into a “wilderness of intrigue.“32
With Monroe exercising no more control than if he had remained
in Virginia,the power and prestige of the presidency steadily deterio
rated, and John Quincy Adams, his Secretary of State, shouldered much of
the administration's responsibility.
work of Adams.

Even the “Monroe Doctrine*® was the

And as the presidency declined. Congress moved in to

fill the vacuum.

By accepting congressional solutions to perplexing

^®Morton Borden, Review of 111 Feeling in ;ttie Era of Good Feelings
Western Pennsylvania Political Battles, 1815°l8^,~l)ÿ James A, Kehl, Ohio
Historical Qu^terly (October, 19^6), p. L2l.
~
^^Turner,

cit., p. 266.

^^James T. Adams, The Adams Faigiily (Boston, 1930), p. 109.
^^Turner, o£. cit., p. 198.
^^Go G. Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston, 1937), p. 167.
Hereafter referred to as “Clay.”
33
Binkley, 0£. cit., p. 100.

p r o b l e m s ,

Monroe made it possible for Congress to overshadow the presi

dent during the period, although it too, under the pressures of the day,
tended to degenerate into an arena for the conflicts between rival fac
tions.3^
The partisan bickering reached a peak in the upper echelons of
the administration, the cabinet itself. Even Monroe’s patience and dig
nity finally gave way. When Secretary of the Treasury William H. Craw
ford, busily maneuvering to place himself in a position where he could
succeed Monroe, called the president a 'damned, infernal old scoundrel"
because Monroe had failed to make certain appointments at Crawford’s
request, "Monroe grabbed some fire-tongs and threatened to ring for ser
vants to throw him out of the White

H o u s e .

"^6 This was the same Crawford

who had been narrowly defeated by Monroe in a congressional caucus for
the nomination for the presidency in I8I6 by the margin of 11 votes, in
an election which was .ooked upon by at least one observer as the begin
ning shot in the campaign

cf

182U.37

In the campaign of 1820 the chief interest was not in the reelection of James Monroe, which was conceded by everyone, but in the
choice of his successor.

To illustrate this, a congressional caucus

which was held in April, 1820, to nemanate Henry Clay, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, for the vice-presidency, was able to take no
action because of the fear of some members that Clay would use the
^^Turner, o£. cit., p. 177.
^^Bemis, 0£. cit., p. 16.
37
Turner, loc. cit.

10
position as a Stepping-stone to the Presidency.^®
Monroe was not elected ■unanimously in 1820 — one vote was cast
against him by William Plumer of New Hampshire. Why Plumer did not vote
for Monroe remains,somewhat of a ngrstery. The traditional view has it
that Plumer did not vote for Monroe because he wanted to prevent any
other man from equalling the unanimous vote that Washington received in

1768 and 1792. Others, however, feel that Plumer*s motive was simply a
belief that Monroe did not have enough ability for the job.^^ Indeed, in
keeping with the view that the election of 1820 was nothing more than the
first round in the battle of l82b, one historian feels that Plumer voted
for John Quincy Adams instead of Monroe "in order to register Adams
before the people for 182U."^®
Some of Monroe*s supporters, appalled at the struggle that was
building up within the administration as the election of 182U approached,
and realizing that the number of potential candidates would probably
result in an election by the House of Representatives, suggested Monroe
as a candidate for a third term.^

But the matter was dropped and the

field opened to an all=out, no-holds-barred fight between five leading
candidates.

^^Everett S. Brown, "The Presidential Election of 182^-2^,
Political Science Quarterly, XL (September, 192^), p. 38U.
^^Hatch, 0£. cit., p. 15^.
^^emis, op. cit., p. 12.
^^cMaster, 0£. cit., p. $1.

CHAPTER I
THE CANDIDATES

Who were the contenders for the highest office in the land in 182I|,
and how had they come to be considered for this position?
The first candidate officially entered the race for the presidency
in 1821, when the South Carolina legislature nominated John C„ Calhoun,
then Monroe's Secretary of War.

Calhoun, who was to be the youngest of

the candidates, had appeared on the national political scene in I8II,
when he was elected to the House of Representatives.

In the House he had

been one of the "War Hawks," and a champion of the "new"' school of Jeffer
sonians which had emerged curing the War of I8l2 and who favored a tariff
and internal improvements.

Calhoun's views cn these major issues later

led him to look toward the nortn for support during the campaign.^
Considered by some historians to be a powerful analyst who was
"brilliant to the point of

rashness,

"2 Calhoun is looked upon by others

as a contradictory character who had the air of an arch-conspirator, and
who ambitiously pursued the presidency while busily pretending that he
did not want the office.3 The apparent contradiction of Calhoun's rever
sal of his stand on internal improvements and the tariff between I8I7 and
^Roseboem,

cit., p. 80.

^an Deusen, Clay, p. 166.
&emis, 0£o cit., p. 18.
11

12
1828, is explained by Frederick J. Turner as being due primarily to his
environment.

Calhoun, Turner maintains, had been bom to a frontier

family, and as a result had been a democratic, idealistic, political
theorist in his youth.

Later, when his native region changed from a

frontier to a cotton-and-slave region, Calhoun’s viewpoint changed, too.^
Not all historians agree with the traditional view of Calhoun as
the foremost spokesman of the planter aristocracy of the south.

Some

instead see him as a '"philosopher of reaction," whose anticipation of
the class struggle and support of an alliance between planters of the
south and manufacturers of the north made him a forerunner of Marxiststyle economic determinism.^ One of these historians claims that Cal
houn’s analysis of American politics and the sectional struggle "fore
shadowed some of the seminal ideas of Marx’s system . , . Q a n ^

placed

the central ideas of scientific socialism in an inverted framework of
moral values and produced an arresting defense of reaction."6 still
another observer denies that Calhoun was the spokesman for the planter
aristocracy, and instead portrays him as a leader of the back-country
masses in a search for democracy.?
Whatever the interpretations of Calhoun’s character and motives,
there seems to be little doubt that he desired the presidency, and had a
^^Tumer, 0£. c^„, pp. 183-8L.
%1chard N„ Current, "John C. Calhoun, Philosopher of Reaction,"
The Antioch Review, III (Summer, 19U3), p. 225.
^Hofstadter, 0£. cit., p. 68.
7
W. E. Dodd, Statesmen cf the Old South (New York, 1911), p. 101.

13
good chance of getting it, especially if any event should occur to hurt
O
the chances of John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay„° As late as the begin
ning of 1823, Calhoun was looked upon as the only candidate with a chance
against Adams, especially among the ex^ederalists of New England, who
were still angry over Adams® "desertion® during the War of 1 0 1 2 Still,
his chances were bound to be hurt by the general feeling that the north
was "entitled" to the next term of the presidency
The second contender entered the political arena in 1022, when
the Tennessee legislature nominated Andrew Jackson, the "Hero of New
Orleans," At the time of his nomination, Jackson was living in retire
ment at his Tennessee plantation, after having resigned as Governor of
Florida the previous year.

In retirement or out, however, "Old Hickory"

was a figure of naticnal Importance, and had been since leading a back
woods militia to victory over the British at New Orleans,

Jackson had

by turns been a veteran of the American Revolution when a mere boyg a
member of the Tennessee Constitutional Convention of 1796 (where tradi
tion has it he named the state)| a former member of Congress| a justice
of the Supreme Court of Tennessee; a compander-in-chief of the Tennessee
Militia; a major-general in the Ü, S„ Army; and conqueror of Florida,
Andrew Jackson needed no introduction to the American people.
The traditional view of the emergence of Andrew Jackson on the
American political scene "according to prevalent twentieth-century
O
Marquis James, The Life of Andrew Jackson, (New York, 1930),
p , 360,
^Ibid,, p, 367,
^^J, T. M:rgt

Jvtin Quincy Adams (Boston, 1002,, p, lu9.

IL

textbook doctrine"ïï sees Jackson as the personification of the Déclara^
tion of IndependenceJ who, in response to a plaintive call from the masses,
"came, like the great folk heroes, to lead them out of captivity and bond=
ageo**^^ To such an exponent of this “traditional" view as Turner, Jackson
was "the very personification of « o . democracy," and the “incarnation
of the popular idea of democracy»
To some recent historians, however, Jackson was a demogogue, not
a democratI an aristocrat, not a frontiersman| a political opportunist
who capitalized on an imiriense personal popularity to bring political
power to himself and his unscrupulous backers.

Thomas P- Abernathy, for

example, maintains that Jackson was a political opportunist, who, instead
of championing the people’s cause, encouraged them to champion his.^^
According to this view, Jackson’s political successes were a result
rather than a cause of the rise of democracy, with Jackson supporting a
democratic movement (which he little understood) because it supported
him.^^ And in direct opposition to the traditional view of a reluctant
Jackson who did not seek the presidency, members of this school of his
torians see in Jackson a clever politician who skillfully refused to
commit himself on the issues cf the day,^^ but instead tailored his
-^^Cunllffe, og.

p. 150o

■^‘‘Schlesinger, og, cit., p. L3.
13
Turner, og. cit., p. 190.
Thomas P. Abernethy, "Apdrew Jackson and the Rise of South
western ReiTîAcracy,*' American Historical Review, XXXIII, p. 76.
15
Thomas P. Abernethy, ’Andrew Jackson," the Dictionary of Ameri
can Biography, IX, p. 53L.
^^an Deusen, op. cit., p. 169.

15
campaign to appeal to all sections of the electorate.1? In line with
this picture of Jackson as politician par excellence, we see him substi=
tuting his image as a public hero for a stand on issues which might cost
him votesj^® and capitalizing on his tremendous personal popularity among
the politically-illiterate.^^
To counter the traditional view of Jackson as a frontiersman,
Richard Hofstadter points out that **from the beginning of his career in
Tennessee he considered himself to be and was accepted as an aristocrat,
and his tastes, manners, and style of life were shaped accordingly.^20
Another historian sharing this point of view even denies that Jackson had
founded what has been traditionally called “Jacksonian Democracy," point
ing out that it was really William Carroll, a political opponent of
Jackson in Tennessee who was "the real father of the democratic movement"
in that s t a t e . T h e most recent biographer of Andrew Jackson states
that Old Hickory “contributed little or nothing to the development of
popular rule" in the years before he became president.^2 And still
another recent observer agrees that "Jacksonian Democracy" in Tennessee
predated Jackson.^3
3-%arold C. Syrett, Andrew Jackson - His Contribution to the
American Tradition, (New York, 1^53), p. ?8.
X8
Bemis, op. cit., p. lii.
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James,
cit., p. 38U.
^^ofstadter,

cut., p. UU.

^Van Deusen, Clay, p. .68.
22

Syrett, C£„ cit., p. 21.

■^^c-anliffe, op. cit., p. ISU»
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Some historians even question the long-supported view that Jack
son was first and foremost â westerner, supported by the west.

Bray

Hammond, for example, sees much of Jackson's support coming from New York
financial interests as well as the west,^^ and Hofstadter looks upon
Jackson's eventual triumph in 1828 as neither an uprising of the west
against the east, nor a mandate for economic reform, but rather as the
result of a militant nationalism coupled with the demand for equal access
to office.2?
In 1822, the same year that the Tennessee legislature backed
Jackson for the presidency, the Republican members of the Kentucky legis
lature nominated Henry Clay, Speaker of the United States House of Repre
sentatives.

Clay had been born in Virginia during the Revolution, and

orphaned at seventeen. A successful frontier lawyer, he soon found him
self in Congress, where he was boosted into the speakership by his fellow
**War Hawks."
Easily “the most personable candidate,"26 clay was a warm-hearted,
dashing, self-confident, extrovert.

Although he is generally recognized

as a powerful orator who loved active leadership, he has been called by
one historian "a strong leader, but a weak guide" whose imagination often
^^In defense of Jackson's apparent support of creditors against
debtors in Tennessee which gave rise to the above charges, Arthur M.
Schlesinger Jr. says that Jackson's motive in so doing was not to protect
the banks, but to prevent inflation, (Schlesinger, og. cit., pp. 36, 37)
Schlesinger gives no reason for Jackson's support of a measure which would
have "despoiled many small farmers of their lands for the benefit of
speculators," however. (Ibid., p. 37.)
^%ofstadter, og. cit., p. 5U»
^^Jaraes,

cit., p. 368.
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ran away with

and whose quick perception went hand-in-hand with

superficial thought»

By nature an impulsive gamester, the impetuous Clay

was prey to vehement impulses, which, when coupled with an imperious tem
per and an ardently combative nature, led him to make rash attacks on his
political foes and at times assume arrogant and dictatorial attitudes»
oQ
Traditionally, Clay is remembered as the "great conciliator,"
whose paramount aim was to preserve the Union in such crises as the
Missouri controversy, the nullification dispute of 1833, and the 'Compro
mise of l850o

In foreign affairs, too. Clay is well-remembered for fash

ioning a policy which strengthened the prestige of the nation at Ghent,
where he had "fought a good fight,"^9 in his support of the South Ameri
can republics in their fight for independence, and in the pacificatory
influence exercised over the Senate in his later years »
It is in domestic affairs, however, where Clay's star shone
most brightly» As Speaker of the House of Representatives, and later
as Senator, Clay acted as opposition leader and watchful critic of the
government»

In this role he is given credit for providing a basis for

the development of a strong and stable two-party system of government»^®
His most widely-known contribution on the domestic scene, however, is
probably the "American System»"

Clay proposed the combination of a pro

tective tariff with internal improvements to tie the various sections of
^^Carl Schurz, The Life of Henry Clay, (Boston, 1899), p» U09c
28

Turner, 0£» cit», p.
29
Van Deusen, Clay, p» 106»
^®Clement EaÉ.oa, Henry Clay and the Art of American Politics,
(Boston, 1957), P» 196»
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the country together into a smoothly-working, coordinated economic unit.
His activities in this area have led one historian to rank him with
Hamilton as an apostle of economic nationalism who anticipated the indus
trial revolution which was to transform A m e r i c a , A n d another critic
sees him as carrying out the old Federalist plan to orient society around
the business and industrial c l a s s e s . I n yet another view, however, he
is interpreted in a very different light -- as a better Jeffersonian than
Jacksonian.33 Such diametrically-opposed views of Clay have led to the
comments that no positive image of Clay really exists,3U and that he
cannot be typed as either a liberal or a conservative.35
One possible explanation for these controversial interpretations
may be discovered in the fact that Clay started his career as a spokesman
of the west, who gradually switched his point of view as he gained favor
with the east, until his increasingly conservative point of view gradu
ally began to alienate the democrats in the west.

Clay’s most recent

biographer, Van Deusen, believes Clay was sympathetic in spirit with the
agrarian west, but at the same time was a protagonist of the industrial
east, both of which forces he attempted to draw together in his "American

% b i d o, p. 195o
^^Schlesinger, o£. cit., pp. 11-12.
^%orton Borden, Review of The Papers of Henry Clay, Vol. I,
James F. Hopkins and Mary W„ M. Hargreaves (eds.), Ohio Historical
Society, XIIX (October, I960), pp. W5=7«
%bid._^

35Eaton, op. cit., p. 196.
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S y s t è m e This actually logical but seemingly contradictory task has
led some critics to accuse him of modifying his opinions to conform to
what was politically expedient!but later observers have recognized no
such inconsistency in his actions,^®
The fourth candidate to enter the race officially was Monroe®s
Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams» A joint meeting of Republican
members of the Massachusetts legislature and delegates from several
towns nominated Adams for the presidency in January, 1823. Like Jackson,
Adams had spent much of his life in the service of his country.
age of eleven he had accompanied his father to France.

At the

By his twenty•=

sixth birthday, he had been appointed American minister to The Hague,
and three years later (in 1797), he was transferred to Berlin.

In 1802

he was elected to the Senate, and although a Federalist, voted for the
embargo, an act which led tc his defeat in the following election.

Then

appointed as minister to Russia and commissioner to Ghent, aftér the War
of I8l2 he was rewarded with the commission as American minister to Great
Britain.

In 1817 he joined Monroe's cabinet.

The state department was

looked upon as the stepping-stone to the presidency, and so Monroe, who
was well aware of northern discontent at the prospect of the succession
of another Virginian, went to New England for Adams, who was eminently
qualified for the position by his background.^9
3&Van Deusen, Clay, p. i;2l;.
^^Schurz, 0£. cit., p. U12.
oO
From a yet unpublished book review of The Papers of Henry Clgy,
Vol. II, by Morton Borden.
^^Roseboom, o£. cit., p. 7^.
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Adams" training for the presidency had been so thorough that it
has been said that his parents planned it that way.^® The "best-equipped
o » o and c o o most experienced statesman that America had up to that
time producedg

Adams was honest to a fault, loyal, experienced, compe

tent, intelligent, and devoted == on this his biographers seem to be
largely agreed. But they are also nearly unanimous in their view that
Adams was also blunt, grim, almost rude, puritanic, and austere, petty
in small things, as well as being a sharp-tongued, "undiplomatic diplomat"
whose aloof, suspicious nature repelled people
Not all Adams" biographers are as unanimous in their judgements
of how vigorously he was willing to campaign for the presidency, however.
In most accounts, Adams is pictured as a dedicated public servant, who,
although possessed with a "gnawing" ambition to be president,^3 refuses
to lower himself to struggle

for the office in the political arena.

According to a typical view of this nature, Adams is seen as refusing to
purchase newspaper support, unwilling to "harangue

on his own behalf,

and trying to be "ci'^l of speech" as his only concession to campaigning
Other historians paint a very different picture of how far Adams was will
ing to go to win the presidency.
^®Bemis,

Some commentators see him as firmly

cit,, p, 3

W, Burgess, The Mddle Period, (New York, 1897), p, 132,
ii2

^ Roseboom, go, cit., p, 80,
^^Adams,

cit., p. 179,

^^ward Channing, A History of the United States, (New York,
1921), pp, 32S, 391,
^%orse,

cit., p. 166.
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resolved not to enter the struggle in the beginning, but gradually losing
this resolve until finally, on the eve of the election, he is unwilling
to

"neglect a single chance" of trying to win siç>port for

himself.

^6

The final figure to officially enter the race for the presidency
was William H. Crawford of Georgia, Monroe’s Secretary of the Treasury.
Crawford was nominated 1:^ a poorly-attended congressional caucus in
February, l82lto In the late summer of 1823 he had suffered a paralytic
stroke which left him "paralyzed in every limb, speechless, nearly blind
and nearly deaf."^^ His backers seem to have attempted to prevent the
knowledge of his condition from becoming widespread.^® The poor attend
ance at the caucus was primarily due to a boycott by the supporters of
the other candidates who realized that Crawford was certain to get the
party nomination as the favorite, and hoped to discredit his nomination.
Crawford had been born of an impoverished but genteel family in
Virginia and raised in Georgia, where he elevated himself to a respectable
position by dint of hard work. He had been elected to the Senate in 1806,
and had become president of that body in I8l2. Later he was minister to
France, and had been finally appointed head of the Treasury by Monroe.
A controversial figure, Crawford claimed to have the support of the regu
lar Republicans and Jefferson,^® although there is evidence that Adams
j, ^2,0 cit., p. 3^0
^^James, op. cit., p. 376.
^®James Parton. The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York, 1888), p. 2l+.
^%atch, 1^0 cit., p. 162.
^®Frederick Ogg, The Reign of Andrew Jackson (New Haven, 1921),
p. 76.
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was really favored by the “Sage of Honticello.®^^ Called by some "the
purest and ablest statesman of his day® who had every right to the presidency he had almost’won in l8l6,^^ he is looked upon by others as a
scheming and wholly-selfish politician whose only claim to fame was as
author of an act in 1820 which would limit the terms of certain presi=
dential appointees to four years.

This act is looked upon by some his

torians as "an electioneering device® on Crawford*s part which was
designed to secure subservience to himself among the treasury officials.
Others deny that there is any truth to this chgurge.^^
One other man. De Witt Clinton, governor of New York and "Father
of the Erie Canal,® had been mentioned as a possible candidate for the
presidency. A hostile New York legislature which was controlled by
Martin Van Buren and the "Albany Regency,® however, refused to put him
forward for consideration.^^

^^ilbert Chinard, Honest John Adams (Boston, 1933), p. 3U3o
Claude Bowers, Party Battles
1922), p. 106.

of

the Jackson Period, (Boston,

^^Channing, eg. cit., p. 3^3»
^^Carl R. Fish, “The Crime of W. H. Crawford,^ American Historical Review, XXI, p.
cito, p.

6^0

CHAPTER II
THE ELECTION
While some historians maintain that the candidates themselves
actually did very little campaigning in the modem sense of the word,^
competition between them and among their supporters reached a frenzy in
Monroe’s second termg
The ambitious bickerings of Crawford and Calhoun rent the Cabi
net, while their friends warred in the South to gain advantage.
Confusion was only worse confounded when Clay returned to the
House and Jackson came to the genate of the Eighteenth Congress,
both busily seeking favor.
The previous Congress, too, had "degenerated into a mere arena for the
conflicts of rival personal factions" =- in the words of Frederick
Jackson Turner.^
Certain observers feel that there was little choice between the
candidates in 182U because they were members of the same political party
and took basically the same stands on issues.^ In addition, some candi
dates refused to take a definite stand on some particular issues because
in doing so they would be likely to alienate other factions of the Repub=
Ogg, C£o cit., p. 82.
2

Van Deusen, Clay, p. 167.

&urner,
\]unliffe,

cit., p. 19U.
cit., p. 151
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lican party, without whose support they would be unable to win.^ Turner
feels that they were forced by public pressure to declare themselves on
the more inqportant questions, but refused to take definite stands other
wise for fear of losing votes.&
To an extent, therefore, the campaign was more of a personality
contest than any battle between representatives of conflicting ideologies.
The major candidates even found themselves searching for principles to
back.7
This view, that personalities rather than issues were the major
factors in the campaign of 182U, is not shared by all historians.

Marquis

James, for example, discovers important issues in the campaign under the
superficial personality clashes.® And Allen Johnson feels that these
points of difference were formed in congressional debates early in 182U,
and entered the campaign soon after.^ Among the most important of these
issues wereg

internal improvements at federal expense| nationalism

versus sectionalism^ the effects of slavery in general and the Missouri
controversy in particularj the Florida treatyj economic factors, such as
the depression of 1819, and the tariffj and finally, growing democracy
and its effects, including attacks on the nominating and electing mechan
isms.
^Hatch, 0£, cit., p. 1$7«
gTurner, o£. cit., p. 2$7.
9
7
Cunliffe, o^. cit., p. 162.
0
James,
cit., p. 36U.
g
Johnson, eg. cit., p. 308.
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Sectionalism is looked upon as being an important factor in the
election by many historians.

The problems facing the country at that

time were primarily sectional, and each of the candidates represented
different sections of the country.^® Yet, Marcus Cunliffe tends to
minimize the importance of sectional factors in the campaign, maintain
ing that each candidate had opponents within his own section, and that
it was impossible to theorize about any simple cleavage either between
sections or between east and west.^^ Eugene Roseboom, however, who
sees sectionalism as playing a very insertant role in the campaign,
feels that New England was divided on the tariff question and opposed
to internal improvements| the south against higher tariff rates and
internal improvements| and the west in favor of a higher tariff and
internal improvements.

This “new sectionalism,** explains Roseboom, was

responsible for the end of Monroe®s one-party system.
Results of the balloting are employed as evidence to support the
view that sectionalism was an important factor in the election.

After

all, Adams captured the New England vote, and Clay's strength was in the
Ohio valley, where his “American System** had much appeal.

Sectionalism

has even been blamed for the fact that less than one-third as many voters
went to the polls in 182U as in 1828, because the triumph of particular
candidates in certain states was supposed to be so assured that voters
lost interest in the contest in these states.
p. 76.
^^unliffe, c£. cit., pp. l58, 161.
^^oseboom,

cit., pp. ?8, 79.
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Economic factors which seemed to be of considerable importance
during the election of I82I4.were the tariff and depression of I819. The
depression greatly encouraged popular political activity, especially on
the part of the land buyers in the south and west who were pressed to
the wall by foreclosures»^^ Other segments of society dissatisfied with
economic conditions of the period were the workingmen of the northern
and middle states, who were unhappy with the American Systemj and the
plftpters in the south, who were discontented with falling cotton

p r i c e s . lb

Those groups who were hurt by adverse economic conditions tended to unite
behind Jackson, according to Turner.1^ But the influence of these eco^
nomic factors on the outcome of the election are played down by some
observers, who feel that the effects of "the depression and panic of 1819
were largely ever by 182U.1^ Hostility toward banks and creditors had
disappeared from the scene by that time, to be replaced by animosity
toward established political machines.1?
The attitude of the candidates toward economic factors were as
varied as the attitude of historians toward the effects of these factors
on the election.

Calhoun favored and supported a high tariff and internal

improvements, which gained him support in the north, particularly in
13

Hofstadter, og. cit., pp. 1|9“^0.

^Schlesinger, og. cit., p. 33.
Turner, og. cit., p. 191.
Johnson, og, cit., p. 309.
^"^Hofstadter, og. cit., p.

53.
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Pennsylvania.^^ Clay, of course, was the champion of the tariff and the
father of the American System and internal improvements. Adams, while he
seems to have "nedged™ on the matter of the tariff, was more open in sup
port of internal improvements, where he “proceeded to outstrip Henry
C l a y . Jackson, too, was evasive on the major issues,^0 but his voting
record in the Senate and contemporary letters indicates that he favored
internal improvements and a “judicious™ tariff.Jackson's main justi
fication for internal improvements seemed to be based on the need for
military preparedness. At this stage of development, Jackson does not
seem to possess the hatred of the national bank which characterized his
later years. While in the Senate he did not oppose the Bank of the
United States,and at least one observer attributes Jackson's later
attitude toward the Bank to Martin Van Buren's influence.
The only one of the five principle candidates whose stand on
economic measures differed appreciably from the others was Crawford.

Most

historians seem to feel that Crawford, like Adams and Jackson, was inten
tionally ambiguous in his attitude toward the tariff, preferring to create
the general impression that he accepted and reflected his sections' view
point. Yet Ulrich Phillips maintains that Crawford was inclined to favor
18
Turner, 0£. cit., p. 196.

19
Bemis, ©£. cit., pp. 2$, 26.
20
James, og. cit., p. 36I4.0
21
Parton, og. cit., pp. 35, 36.
22

Bemis,
cit., pp. 23-26.
23
Abernethy, American Historical Review, p. 76.
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"moderate** p r o t e c t i o n H i s stand on the matter of internal improvements
seems to have been intentionally cloudy, h o w e v e r . G e n e r a l l y , Crawford's
espoused views seemed to parallel those of the traditional Jeffersonian
Republicans, stressing democracy, economy, reform, and states' right.

26

Because of the similarity and ambiguity of the views of the major
candidates, voters == as already noted == tended to concentrate on per
sonality differences.

This confusion over issues also may have been at

least partially responsible for the concentration of Crawford's opponents
on the "undemocratic•' aspects of the congressional caucus system of nomi
nating presidential candidates.

This, coupled with the entrance of the

masses into the political arena for the first time, led to such a public
outcry against the caupus that Hofstadter sees it as one of the two
"chief" issues of the campaign.
'i'ne congressional caucus system of nominating candidates for the
presidency came into being, according to Thomas Hart Benton, when "the
eminent men of the Revolution, to Wiom public opinion awarded a prefer
ence, were passing away, and when new men, of more equal pretensions,

rtO
were coming upon the s c e n e . B e n t o n goes on to point out that public
sentiment was followed, not led, by these earlier caucuses.

Although the

^^Ulrich Phillips, '*Wi]liam H. Crawford," The Dictionary of
American Biography, IV, p. 259»
^^Tumer, 0£. cit., p. 256.
^^James,
27

cit., p. 36^.

Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 53.

^®Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years in the U. S. Senate (New
York, 1897), p. 29.
~
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caucus was an old and respected institution,^^ it had come under criti=
cism as early as the election of I8l6, when the main interest in the
campaign was provided by attacks on the caucus.

In 1820 it was “poorly

attended.“30
According to Allen Johnson, growing democracy led to an increased
dissatisfaction with the caucus method of selecting candidates on the
part of the newly-enfranchised masses, ancj finally to a refusal by the
rank and file party members to allow the party leaders to dictate to
31
them.^^ The people remonstrated against a system which had maintained
the Virginia dynasty by mechanically promoting the Secretary of State to
the presidency.32 The west, led the opposition to the caucus, and Turner
sees Jackson's nomination by the Tennessee legislature as the signal of
the revolt by the states against the caucus.33 since the caucus was con
sidered undemocratic and out of step with the times, it had to go, and
there were many who were willing to speed it on its ways
All the candidates but Crawford were against the caucus. All
the newspapers, except those devoted to Crawford, were against
it. Several of the state legislatures adopted strong resolu
tions in reprehension of it. Public meetings denounced it.
Ponderous essays were hurled at it| facetious squibs assailed
it . , . the torrent , . . rolled on in ever-increasing
strength,3u
^James, 0£. cit., p. 388.
3%oseboom, 0£, cit., p. 7?o
3^Johnson, og. cit., p. 305<.
^^Binkley,

cit., p. 100,

33Tumer, og. cit., p. 252.
^Varton,

cit., pp.

25 , 2 6 .
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Leading the fight against the caucus were the Jackson supporters,
whose main line of attack was their demand that the people be allowed to
select the

p r e s i d e n t , 35

either by direction election or by voting for the

electors* Jacksonians in the Tennessee legislature even adopted a reso
lution against the caucus, in which they asked other states to concur*
In this protest, the legislators objected to the caucus on the grounds
that it was unconstitutional, ^inexpedient and impolitic,™ worked to the
disadvantage of the weaker states, forced members of Congress who might
later be asked to choose the president to “prejudge the case" by pledg
ing their support of certain candidates, and finally, endangered the
liberties of the people by giving to caucus nominations the force of
precedence,36

Although the Jacksonians led the fight against the caucus, the
other candidates — with the obvious exception of Crawford — were
equally opposed to it.

Congressman George McDuffie of South Carolina

observed that Calhoun, Clay, Jackson, and Adams were all out to “give
the caucus a death blow™ with the objective of ending Crawford»s presi
dential aspirations*37 Since there was general recognition of the fact
that the caucus would select Crawford because he had the largest number
of supporters in Congress,38 the opposition of the other candidates to
the caucus was probably based on something more than concern for the
^^Turner, ^ * cit., p. 252,
36
Henry S. Coramager, Documents of American History (New York,
1958), p. 237*
— —
— ------37
James,
38
Benton,

cit,, p* 388,
cit,, p, U9*
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people's welfare. Marquis James observes that "the record fails to con
firm the implication that had Jackson, Adams, Clay or Calhoun been able
to raise up the support in Congress enjoyed by Mr, Crawford, there would
not have been so much high-handed indignation against the caucus,
Whatever their motives, thundering opposition to the caucus by four-fifths
of the politicians and newspapers in the country made an impression,
ford's opponents,

Craw

realizing his strength, boycotted the caucus, and the

smallness of the attendance weakened its already diminished authority,
The caucus died with Crawford's hopes in the election of 182U,
Another immediate and obvious effect of the entrance of the masses
into politics was seen in the increasing public criticism of the electoral
college as a method of selecting the president, and the concurrent demand
that candidates for that office by selected by direct popular ejection.
In a typical situation, a "popular outburst" in New Y©rk forced the
state legislature to go through the motions of providing a popular elec
toral law. This ruse failed to deceive the people, and the .electorate
punished the legislators at the polls the following

N o v e m b e r , ^1

In the attack on the electoral system as well as in the attack
on the caucus, the Jacksonians were agMn in the foreground,

Thomas

Hart Benton, a leading Jackson supporter, advocated a system which he
felt would be more democratic.

In Benton's system, the people would vote

James,
cit., p, 388,
)|Q
Hatch, 0£o cit,, p, 16it,
^Edward M. Shepard, The Life of Van Buren (New York, 1892),
p. 97.
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directly for the president and vice-president, with a second election
between the two highest candidates provided if no candidate had a majority
on the first ballot.

ii2

In a proposed amendment to the Constitution, Ben

ton suggested that presidential elections should be held by districts,
with each State divided into as many districts as it had senators and
representatives, and each district to cast one ballot separately.

If no

candidate had a majority, a run-off election between the two highest
would be held on the same basis.
Though the Jacksonians led the pack in advocating democracy in
response to the rising political power of the masses, the other candi
dates seemed to be just as aware of the increasing importance of the
newly-enfranchised voter, and just as determined to capture his vote.
Crawford, Adams, Clay, and Calhoun were “*mindful of the awakening of the
masses,

£^d each striving"] to clothe himself in the garments of the

people’s true and original friend."^ Such an astute politician as
John C. Calhoun, in a conversation with John Quincy Adams as early as
the spring of 1820, observed "an immense revolution of fortunes in every
part a general mass of disaffection to the government not concentrated in
any particular direction, but ready to seize upon any event and looking
out anywhere for a l e a d e r . A l l the presidential candidates made it
^^Benton,

cit., pp. U9=50.

^^0 Mo Meigs, The Life of Thomas Hart Benton (Philadelphia,
190U), p. 151.
^James,
Hofstadter,

cit., p. 355»
cit., pp. 50-51.

33
necessary for them to find issues with a nation-wide popular appeal.

As

Marcus Cunliffe comments, “political power lay waiting to be seized by
whoever could most artfully appeal to the ordinary man.“^^
So another result of the growing enfranchisement of the mass of
the people was to be the emergence of the demagogue, “As poor farmers
and workers gained the ballot, there developed a type of politician that
had existed only in embryo in the Jeffersonian period — the technician
of mass leadership, the caterer to mass sentiment,

Under these poli

tical conditions, “continuous propaganda" became essential to political
s u c c e s s . O r , in the words of Thomas Abernethy:
Electioneering, unknown in the earlier days, grew rapidly in
vogue during the period following 1819. Stunç speaking came
to be an art, and cajolery a profession, while whiskey flowed
freely at the hustings. The politicians could most easily
attain their objectives by appealing to the prejudices of the
masses . . . the ignorant were asked to elect the ignorant
because enlightenment and intelligence were not democratic.^9
This was the period in which such terms as "logrolling,® “Gerry
mandering,® “lobbyist,® and “noncommital® became part of the American
political vocabulary.

A typical representative of this new-type of

American politician was Martin Van Buren of New York, "The Sly Fox of
Kinderhook,® whom Marcus Cunliffe characterizes as “a manipulator . „ „
with his quick, temporizing, managerial skill, his tact, and his
^^Cunliffe, og. cit., p. 17U.
U7
Hofstadter, og. cit., p. u9<
lowers., og. cit., p. 1, preface.
Ii9
Abernethy,

cit., p. 70.

^^Cunliffe,

cit., p. 179®
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professional affability [~wfaich ] established him as a representative of
the American democracyo

James Parton, in looking back at the election

of I82U, observed that the majority of voters in that election were not
"'enlightened,® and therefore
not intelligent enough to be moved by arguments addressed to
the understanding, „ „ftheyl could feel, but not think;
listen to stump orations but not read; „ » „ could be
wheedled, and flattered, and drilled by any man who was
quite devoid of public spirit, principle, and shame. . . .
Here was the field of the managing politician.
These were
the voters who were the hope of the schemer, the despair of
the patriot. They were numerous in 182^.52
One final factor Wiich had some effect on the outcome of the
election of l82ii was the Missouri question and the related slavery issue.
Of all the candidates, Adams seems to have had the clearest understanding
of the true significance of the coming dispute over slavery, and propheti
cally viewed slavery as a possible basis for political division, and even
a menace to the U n i o n . B u t he refused to commit himself openly as
either for or against the institution.^^ Generally, the opinion seems to
be that Adams received a few votes from the anti-slavery men, but that
Missouri was of little Importance in the election. Yet Turner feels that
the Missouri controversy was of considerable significance.

It caused a

split between Pennsylvania and New York, which hurt Crawford; put Clay
on the spot as a compromiser; benefitted Adams as a northern candidate;
and helped Jackson as a slave-holder idio was favored in the south for
^^Ibid., pp. 6, 7„
^^arton,
Ç-Î
Turner,

cit., p. 119.
cit., pp. 193s

^^emis, Gg. cit., pp. 26-27.
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this reasoïij, but voted for in the anti-slavery states as a friend of
democracy»
As the campaign entered the spring and summer of 1823, Crawford
was apparently leading the contestants^^ as the ""regular" candidate and
the favorite of the politicians»^"^ But as the favorite he came in for
heavy attacks from the other candidates»^®
Disaster in three separate forms destroyed Crawford*s chances.
In addition to the stroke of paralysis and the stigma of having been
nominated by the "undemocratic" caucus, Crawford’s cause was scuttled in
New York,

Here a young newspaperman, Thurlow Weed, made a secret deal

with one of the Clay men which secured most of the votes for Adams,

Weed

thus outwitted the professional politicians of the Albany Regency, and
its leader, Martin Van Buren, who were backing Crawford,
The New York election was also one of the major causes of Clay’s
downfall»

In the bargaining for votes in New York, the Adams’ forces,

led by Weed, had guaranteed Clay the seven votes that were estimated to
be needed to put his name before the House of Representatives as one of
the three top candidates»
good position to win»

As Speaker, Clay would have been in a very

But because of trickery on the part of the Adams’

men. Clay wound up with four instead of seven electoral votes, and was
^^Turner, og» cit», pp» 192=93»
^^Tumer, i^» cit., p» 2^8»
57

Shepard, og»

p» 91»

Phillips, og, cit», P» 529»
59
Roseboom, ^ » cit», p„ 83»
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beaten for third place by Crawfordo^*^ Clay would still have had a chance
if he had carried Louisiana, as he was expected to do because of his nomi
nation by that state. For some reason, however, his expected support
never materialized»

One explanation is that three of his backers in the

Louisiana legislature became so "seriously indisposed" that they were
unable to a t t e n d T h e five electoral votes of the state, which would
have brought Clay's name before the House, were divided between Adams and
Jackson»
Another once-serious contender, John C„ Calhoun, was eliminated
in a state race, when Pennsylvania went for Jackson»

Jackson's unex

pected showing in the Keystone state is explained by Wilfred Binkley as
being due to his popularity among the “extreme" democrats in the western
part of the state »

Other observers see the wide-spread publicity

given a letter Jackson's backers had him write to a Pennsylvania bar
keeper extolling the virtues of democracy,and pro-Jackson propaganda
and popular animosity toward the caucus, as being decisive factors in
Pennsylvania»

In any event, Calhoun was defeated at the hands of the

Jackson forces in Pennsylvania and withdrew from the race to concentrate
on the vice-presidential contest»

And with Calhoun's withdrawal from the

race, his supporters in North and South Carolina, Maryland, and New Jersey
were free to go over to tne Jackson camp in exchange for second place on
^^an Deusen, Clay, pp» 176-78»
^^aniel Mallory, Henry Clay (New York, no date;, p» 128«
^2
Binkley, o£„ cit», p» 110»
James, op» cit», p» 163»
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the ticket for their man. 6U
All through the campaign, every possible coalition between the
candidates was explored, and these schemes indicate the confused character
of the politics of the period»^^ Among the possible coalitions mentioned
at one time or another were those involving Clay and Clinton, Clay and
Crawford, Crawford and Adams, Adams and Jackson, Clay and Adams, Jackson
and Crawford, Jackson and Clay, Adams and Calhoun, and finally, Jackson
and Calhoun.
As election time approached, the campaign that has traditionally
been viewed as "the most scurrilous America had known,
of bitterness and personal animosity.

reached a peak

In the words of Glyndon Van

Deusens
The bitterest charges and counter-charges were made by the partisans of all the candidates. Adams was accused :f a whole
category of sins, ranging from slavery-hating to slovenliness.
The Crawfordites attacked Calhoun®s record as Secretary of War
and sought to drive him in disgrace from public life, while
the latter®s followers retorted in kind upon the Secretary of
the Treasury. Jackson was branded a tyrant, a sinister figure,
full of unbridled passions. Clay was denounced in the most
violent manner. - - - ^
After the scheming, intriguing, maneuvering, plotting, dealing,
and character assassination were over, and the smoke of battle cleared
away, Jackson was leading with 99 electoral votes, followed by Adams with

^^James,

cit., p. 390.

^%an Deusen, Clay, p. 172.
^^Cunliffe,
cit., p. 153.
67
Van Deusen, Clay, pp. x71=<2c
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8Us and Crawford with

Eugene Roseboom discounts the significance

of Jackson®s plurality, pointing out that six of the states had their
electoral votes selected by their legislatures, and the popular vote was
generally light in the others

Yet James Parton takes the view that

the large popular vote for Jackson was a true expression of the will of
the p e o p l e P u b l i c interest in the campaign seems to have begun to
wane even before the electors had been chosen,?^ But, after a brief lull,
intrigue among the politicians reached a new peak on the eve of the House
election. At the center of the alleged manipulations was Henry Clay, who,
because of his position as Speaker of the House, was believed to have the
power to select the next president.

/O
See Table I on pages 39-UO for the complete results of the
election.
^%oseboom,

cit., p. 8U.

^^arton, 0£. cit., p. $1.
7X
James,

cit., p. UlUo
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POPULAR^ AND ELECTORAL® VOTES IN THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF l82U
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CHAPTER III
THE «“CORRUPT BARGAIN“
After the selection of the top three candidates by the electoral
college, and before the final election by the House, most of the voters
■apparently lost interest in the matter, satisfied that Jackson would win
the election in the House.^
This same attitude of nonchalance was not shared by the politi
cians themselves, however, and the political intriguing that had charac
terized Monroe’s second term was renewed and increased as the impending
House election approached.

And the focal point of this intriguing was

the Speaker of the House himself, Henry Clay, whom most observers, then
and now, felt was in a position to select the next president of the
United States.

The political machinations which took place are compli

cated and difficult to unravel, but basically involve two questions -alleged overtures or bribes made ^
bribes made by Clay.

Clayi and alleged overtures or

There are some historians who feel that even Clay,

with his extreme force of personality and persuasive powers, could not
p
alone insure the election of the candidate of his choice.
Politicians
of that day, however, apparently felt that Clay was in a position to
influence the selection, and there is evidence that backers of all three
^James,
cit., p. Uli(.«
p
Roseboom, go. cit., p.
hi

U2
candidates, with or without the consent of their principals, approached
Clay.^ Jackson's backers approached Clay, and Crawford's campaign mana
ger and chief backer, Martin Van Buren, had before the election suggested
an alliance between Clay and Crawford based on the supposition that Craw
ford's poor state of health would make the vice-presidency a very attrac
tive position.

The Adams' forces, too, realized they must get Clay's

support, for there was no possibility of an alliance with Crawford
only Clay could swing the necessary western states from Jackson.^
The vote in the House of Representatives hinged on the vote of
the New York delegation, and that vote was tied, 17-17 with the forces
of Adams opposing the forces of Van Buren and the Albany Regency, who
were supporting Crawford.

The weak link in the Van Buren chain was

General Stephen Van Rensselaer, an old Federalist and brother-in-law of
Alexander Hamilton.

Van Buren had felt that Van Rensselaer was wavering,

and had extracted a pledge from him to vote for Crawford.

But just before

the election. Clay steered him into the Speaker's private room, where with
Daniel Webster "these two masters of persuasion plied Van Rensselaer with
every word, every argument, every artifice at their command,**^ but the
aged patroon held firm. While Webster and Clay had not been able to wring
a concession from Van Rensselaer, they did reduce him to such a state of
nervous agitation that he felt obliged to look to Divine Guidance for help.
Lowering his head to pray, his eyes fell on a slip of paper on the floor
%an Deusen, Clay, p. 180.
^James, 0£. cit., p. I4.O6 .
^Ibid., pp. U37, U38.

U3
with Adams' name written on it -- the sign that he had been looking for.
He picked it up, placed it in the ballot box, and Adams was elected.^
In any event, when Clay finally announced his intentions of sup
posing Adams early in January, Jackson's backers rose up in righteous
indignation, pronouncing Clsgr's decision to be a violation of the will
of the people and the direct result of a "corrupt bargain" between Clay
and Adams. Jackson himself was apparently easily convinced that Clay
had entered into an immoral pact with Adams, especially when Adams
appointed Clay Secretary of State in the new administration, and Jackson's
reaction was short and to the points

"So you see," he wrote, "the Judas

of the West has closed the contract and will receive the thirty pieces of
silver.
The first formal charge that Clay had entered into a "corrupt
bargain" with Adams was made twenty days after Clay had announced his
intentions of supporting Adams in the coming House election, and two
weeks before the election itself.

The specific charge was made in an

anonymous letter to the Columbian Observer, a Philadelphia newspaper.
The letter, dated January 25, 1825, read in part as follows;
DEAR SIR: I take up my pen to inform you of one of the most
disgraceful transactions that ever covered wit*h infamy the
republican ranks. Would you believe that men, professing
democracy could be found base enough to lay the ax at the very
root of the tree of liberty? . „ , such a bargain as can only
by equaled by the famous Burr conspiracy of 1801, For some
time past, the friends of Clay have hinted that they, like the
Swiss, would fight for those who pay best. Overtures were said
-io have been made by the friends of Adams to the friends of
Clay, offering him the appointment of Secretary of State, for
^an Deusen, Clay, p, 191,
?Ibid., p. 193,

Uu

his aid to elect Adams, And the friends of Clay gave the infor
mation to the friends of Jackson, and hinted that if the friends
of Jackson would offer the same price, they would close with
them. But none of the friends of Jackson would descend to such
mean barter and sale, , „ , it is now ascertained to a certainty
that Henry Clay has transferred his interest to John Quincy Adams,
As a consideration for this abandonment of duty to his constitu
ents, it is said and believed, should this unholy coalition pre
vail, Clay is to be appointed Secretary of State, ,
To make certain that Clay saw the letter, the editor of the
Observer sent him a marked copy.

Clay was provoked into answering in a

letter which appeared in the National Intelligencer of January 31, in
which he pronounced the writer of the letter in the Observer "a base and
infamous caluminator, a dastard, and a liar,** and promised to deal with
him on the field of honor,^
Three days later, on February 3, another letter appeared in the
Intelligencer in which the author identified himself as the writer of
the letter in the Observer, and offered to prove the charges.

The

admitted author of the letter was George Kremer, a member of the House
of Representatives from Pennsylvania, variously described as "simpleminded and

e c c e n t r i c ,

"Ï0 «slow-witted,**^^ "illiterate,*'^^ and “hitherto

conspicuous only because of the leopard-skin coat he wore on the floor
of the H o u s e , U p o n finding that Kremer had written the letter. Clay's
arton,

cit,, p, 103»

9
Van Deusen, Clay, p, 189,
10
Berais, 0£, cit,, p, 57,
^^oseboom, og, cit,, p, 87arton, 0£, cit,, p, lOU,
13

James,

cit,, p, U3U»

ardor cooled.

He avoided a duel on the assumption that Kremer was not

worthy to summon to the field of honor.

But he did demand an investiga

tion.
At first Kremer appeared willing to substantiate the charge, vol
unteering to appear before any properly constituted body to offer proof.
But later, when confronted by Clay's friends, Kremer appeared bewildered,
and denied that he had charged Clay with corruption. When the committee
chosen by the House asked him to appear to present evidence, he refused,
and at one point even seemed to be on the point of signing an apology to
Clay.lk
During the investigation the committee refused to summon and
cross-examine witnesses, possibly because the Jacksonians on the committee
became afraid that the charge might backfire and alienate some of Clay's
friends who might be willing to support Jackson,

Clay himself seemed

strangely hesitant to press the investigation any harder, possibly be
cause "every side had its secret to g u a r d , I t has also been suggested
that the Jackson forces themselves may have wanted to see the investiga
tion dropped to prevent the fact that they had been backing Kremer in his
accusations from being r e v e a l e d I n any event, the committee faded
from sight, to re-emerge on February 9, the day of the election in the
House, Whether the committee took no action because it was evident that
^Nran Deusen, Clay, p, 190.
l5
James,
^^Tumer,

cit,, p, 13$,
cit,, p, 268,

U6
there was no proof behind the charge, as one historian claims;

17

or

whether they reported that there was no basis for the charge, as another
asserts;^® or whether their report was only '•milk-and-water** as a third
claims^^ — the investigation accomplished nothing.
Most historians seem to think that Kremer did not write the letter
himself, but #at it was composed by one of Jackson*s backers, who merely
used Kremer as a ”tool.** Parton believes that Kremer actually admitted
that he did not write the letter, but did not identify the author.
Clay himself seemed to be of the opinion that Senator John H„ Eaton of
Tennessee, long a Jackson supporter, was the guilty party, although
p-|

Eaton denied authorship when accused by Clay.

Still another suggested

culprit was James Buchanan, then a member of the House from Pennsylvania. PP
In addition to the difference of opinion among historians over
who actually wrote the letter, there is also some question as to the ori
gin of the "corrupt bargain" charge itself.

Most scholars seem to feel

that Jackson®s camp followers were the perpetrators of the accusation
because they had the most to gain by it.

Such a charge had a good chance

of forcing Clay to oppose Adams in order to disprove the allegation. And
if Clay nevertheless decided to support Adams in spite of the charge, he
17
Roseboom, 0£. cit., p. 87.
18
Bemis, 0£. cit., p. 5^7.
19
James,

cit., p. U35.

^barton, o£. cit., p. 106.
^^allory, 0£. cit., p. 130.
^^Ogg, 0£. cit., p. 90.

kl
would be discouraged from accepting an appointment in the new administra
tion for fear of lending credence to the accusation.

Finally, such a

charge, if accepted widely, would benefit the Jacksonians by damaging the
reputations of Adams and Clay for the campaign of 1828,
There are other historians, however, who feel that the charge was
not originated by the Jacksonians, but rather utilized by them. Marquis
James, for example, believes that “it came from the country =•= West,
South and to a slight extent East.**^^ Glyndon Van Deusen points out that
even before Kremer*s letter appeared, different newspapers controlled by
Crawford, as well as Jackson, attacked Clay for supporting Adams.
If Jackson's backers had made the "corrupt bargain" charge in
order to force Clay to abandon Adams, they were disappointed.

On Janu

ary 8, 1825, Clay announced his intention of supporting Adams in a letter
to one of his lieutenants in Kentucky, Francis P. Blair,

Clay informed

Blair that he was backing Adams as a "choice of e v i l s . I n spite of
the "bargain™ charge. Clay stood behind Adams, and was instrumental in
securing his election by the House a month later.
And if the Jacksonians had hoped the charge would keep Clay from
accepting a position in the new administration, they were again disap
pointed.

On February 12, three days after the election by the House,

Adams designated Clay to be Secretary of State.

In a letter to Monroe

written the day before the announcement of Clay's appointment, Adams
^^James,

cit., p. Wi2.

^Sran Deusen, Clay, pp. 1&9, 190.
^^James, 0£. cit., pp. 1;25, u26.

U8
stated his reasons for selecting Clay as **due to his talents and services
to the western section of the Union, whence he comesj and to the confi
dence in me manifested by their delegations»^^
In light of the later uproar over the “bargain** and the resultant
effects on the careers of Adams and Clay, many observers have been at a
loss to explain why Adams made the offer and why Clay accepted it»

Per

haps Adams and Clay never gauged the amount of animosity that would be
stirred up by the appointment»

Clay, himself, seems to have been sur

prised by the intensity of the tempest, although as a seasoned politician
he expected some adverse comment»^? Adams® friends initially had urged
Clay to take a position in the cabinet, but the violence and volume of
criticism later caused them to request Clay to turn the post down because
of the adverse effects it was sure to visit upon the new administration»^®
In one way, the “corrupt bargain^ charge probably encouraged Adams to make
the appointment and Clay to accept it, for "if the accusation was a chal
lenge to the spirited Kentuckian, it was a call to duty to the Puritan»**^9
And by this time. Clay seemed sure to be criticized whether he accepted
the position or not» Finally, one might reason, as does the historian
Edward Channing, that if Clay refused the post he would be giving color
to the charge»®^
Johnson, o£o cit», p. 315»
27

James, ^ » cit., p. U33o

2®IW», p. Wio
^^Tumer, op. cit., p. 269,
^^Adams, ££. cit., p. 188»

U9
■Whatever the motives of Adams in appointing Clay, and in Clay's
accepting the appointment, the results were undeniable, and altered the
course of American politics for years.

The new administration suffered

an untold amount of damage by being placed on the defensive from the
earliest moments of its existence.

Because of the charge, Adams became

the first president to be confronted with a Congress intentionally and
deliberately organized against an administration which rapidly became a
"four-year martyrdom. "31
As for Clay, almost all commentators conclude that the episode
was detrimental to his later career,

Samuel F. Bemis believes that Clay

was deprived of the presidency by the charge.3^ Clay, himself, is quoted
by Channing as saying that he would not have accepted the Secretaryship
if he had to do it over because by doing so he injured Adams and nimself
politically»33 Glyndon Van Deusen repeats the statement that Clay in
later years publicly acknowledged that accepting Adams' offer was "a
political mistake of the first magnitude."3b

apparently Adams, too,

lived to regret the appointment.35 Only one observer believes that the
charge did not damage Clay to any extent because the ire of the people
was directed primarily against the system then in existence, ana not the
election of Adams.3^
3^Adams, op. cit., p. 188.
3%emis, 0£„ cit., p. 131.

^Channing, o£„ cit., p. 361, footnote.
3Wan Deusen, Clay, p. 192.
35Bemis,

cit., p. 131.

3^illiam MacDonald, Jacksonian Democracy (New York, 1906 ;,
pp. 31, 32,
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On the other hand, the charge probably benefitted Jackson in in
verse proportion to the damage it did Clay and Adams»

In the first place,

it tied Jackson®s name almost inseparably with democracy»

In keeping with

this appearance, Jackson later made a pleas for a constitutional amend
ment which would render congressmen ineligible for administrative offices
for a two=year period following the end of their term of office»

In addi

tion, when he became president, he repeated a suggestion for the popular
election of the executive in all of his eight messages to congress»
Another long-term effect of the "bargain*" charge was the part it
played in helping to create two new political parties to take the place
of the now-defunct Federalist and Republican parties which had faded
from the political scene auring the "Era of Coed Feeling»" In the face
of the "bargain" charge and Clay®s appointment, the anti-Adams forces
united with the Jacksonians, a move which has been hailed as "a landmark
in the history of American party politics»"^? Now unified under the
same political banner were southerners who hated the tariff and feared
a strong central government's opposition to slaveiy^ high-tariff men from
the north who disliked Clay and/or Adams| and demagogues who preyed on
the newly-enfranchised masses — held together by one thing they all had
in common, veneration of Jackson and hatred of Adams and Clay»
opposing camp contained just as many diverse elementss

The

ex-Federalists

following the leadership of Daniel Websterj former Jeffersonian Demo
crats | high-tariff meng and western champions of internal improvements
at national expense — a group generally mere conservative than the
^"^Binkley, ^ » cit», p» UU»

Si
Jacksmiansg but lacking a common focal point of direction and leadership»
In the face of the tremendous uproar touched off by Clay*s sup
port of Adams in the House election and Adams® subsequent appointment of
Clay to the State Department, both Adams and Clay protested what they
obviously felt were unfounded charges » Clay went so far as to secure
written testimony from members of the House to the effect that they had
voted for Adams only because they thought that it was their duty to do
sOo^B In two later addresses. Clay introduced evidences to prove that
he had decided to vote for Adams even before departing from Kentucky, and
that Jackson and Crawford supporters had solicited his support by even
more shameful offers than the one he was accused of accepting»Adams
did not dignify the accusation with a formal protest until after the
expiration of his term of office, at which time he vehemently swore that
the charge was “totally u n f o u n d e d » B u t the net result of all these
protestations seemed to only make people more aware of the charge»
Most historians, especially those examining the evidence long
after the partisan passions that had provoked the charge had subsided,
declared that the accusation was completely unfounded»
on the matter ares

Typical comments

“no definite a g r e e m e n t ; “the falsity of the charge

has been proved as nearly as a negative can be;“h2 g^d “entirely
3®Channing, o£» cit», p» 367,
^%umer, o£» cit», pp» 268, 269.
^^Parton, 0£» cit», p» 117»
^Hatch, ^ » c^», P» 166»
^^Johnson, ©£» cit», p» 315»
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destitute of foundations or even shadow of p r o o f ! E v e n pro=Jackson
contemporaries, such as R, G» Horton, in his campaign biography of
Buchanan,^ as well as Thomas Hart Benton^^ and James Parton,declared
the charge to be without foundation.
While most latter-dagr historians have been as emphatic in denying
the existence of any “corruption™ in the pre-election negotiations be
tween Adams and Clsgr as their predecessors were, there seems to be an
increasing number of observers who are not quite so quick to deny that
azqr “bargain™ did exist between the two men.

In fact, some of these his

torians have even gone so far as to acknowledge the existence of such a
“bargain,™ but deny that it was in any way “corrupt,™ preferring instead
to call it a “gentleman®s agreement,™ “implicit b a r g a i n , o r “entente
cordiale,

but not a “corrupt bargain.“ Turner claims that Adams

walked periously, if safely, along the edge of his conscience at this
time,™ but avoided engaging in any “vulgar bargaining™ with Clay.^^
These later historians, -vdio admit the existence of a “bargain™
^^1111 am Ho Seward, The Life and Public Services of J. Q. Adams
(Auburn, l8U9), p. 165.
G. Horton, The Life and Public Services of James Buchanan
(New York, 1856), p. 76.
U5
Benton, ©£. cit., p. Ufil Marquis James, however, quotes Benton
as saying earlier that “no man, in his right senses, at the public scene
of action as I was™ could fail to believe that a “'bargain™ did exist.
(James,
cit., p. W:5).
^^Parton, go. cit., p. 118„
li'?

^'Bemis, eg. cit., p. 59.
^®Van Deusen, Clay, p. 18?.
Ii9

Turner, op. cit., p. 262.
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bmt deay that it was “corrapt^,

seem to take delight in pointing oat that

“more recent generations have been inclined to wonder at the furore and
to speculate on the number of presidents who have gained office without
pledges and bargains»®^® And some members of this historical school
take equal pleasure in pointing out that Jackson's backers had approached
Clay with a proposal similar to the one Adams® friends were supposed to
have madeo

Indeedg “the friends of all three candidates rushed to court

the Kentuckian's favor and to insinuate attractive rewards,® Van Deusen
concludesJames Buchanan hinted to Clay that he might have the Secre
taryship of State if he supported Jaeksonj and then Buchanan hinted to
Jackson that Clay's support in the House election might be had in exchange
for the pledge that Jackson would not appoint Adams to head the State Departmento^^ Sam Houston, another Jackson supporter, is pictured telling
the Ohio delegation that their support of Jackson in the House would
result in the elevation of Clay to the head of the State Departmento^^
Even Adams' maneuvering on the eve of the House election in an effort to
obtain support seems to be used to minimize the severity of the “bargain®
charges

"the implicit but certainly not corrupt bargain between Adams and

Clay was the least questionable of the several deals . » <, that Adams
to secure election by the House of Representatives,,®^^
^^oseboora, ©go cit., p. 87o
^^an Deusen, Clay, p» 180»
^^Bends,

,

cit «, p„ 130

^&arton, ©go cit», ppo 56, 57»
^^emis, j^o cito, p« 58»
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Buchanan®s role in the pre-election maneuvering came to light
three years after the disputed election.

In a dinner at the Hermitage,

Jackson mentioned that Clay's forces had offered to support him in l82lio
Present at the affair was Carter Beverly from Virginia, who recounted
Jackson's remark in a letter which was later published in a North Caro
lina newspaper.

Clay then published a denial and demanded that Jackson

identify the “friend® of Clay who had approached him with the offer.
Jackson named Buchanan.
When confronted with the accusation, Buchanan issued a state
ment in which he admitted contacting Jackson before the election, but on
his own initiative, and not as a representative of Clay.

Buchanan claimed

that he had asked Jackson if he would appoint Adams Secretary of State if
he were elected, but that Jackson had replied that this was a secret he
would never r e v e a l . I n another slightly different version of this epi
sode, Buchanan is said to hane told Jackson that Clay's friends had been
approached by representatives of Adams with the offer of the job of Secre
tary of State in exchange for support in the upcoming House election.

If

Jackson would publicly declare against continuing Adams as Secretary of
State, then “a conqplete union of Mr. Clay and his friends would put an
end to the presidential contest in one h o u r . W h a t were Buchanan's
motives in making this visit? Marquis James feels that he may have
wanted to help Jackson in spite of himself, and to spare Clay the danger
of making the visit himself.58
arton, go. cit., p. llii.
arton, Pr-ic., i.p.
$7
James,
%bid.

t
cit., p. u22„
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After contacting Jackson while posing as a representative of Clay
without Clay"s permission or knowledge, Buchanan then visited Clay.

In<=

stead of telling the Kentuckian what Jackson actually had said, Buchanan
hinted to him that he could have the Secretaryship of State if he was
willing to support Jackson for the presidency. According to the nine=
teenth-century historian, James Parton, Clay had once threatened to
reveal this overture, when the “'bargain™ charge was being used by his
political opponents, but that Buchanan”s “earnest entreaties™ had induced
Clay to refrain from such action
In addition to the majority of historians who seem to place no
stock in the truth of the “corrupt bargain™ charge, and the minority of
historians who seem to feel that there was an “agreement™ but certainly
no “bargain™ any more “corrupt™ than the many other manipulations and
negotiations of that or later periods, there is at least one historian
who is willing to claim that a “corrupt bargain™ did exist between Clay
and Adaifts, and expends no effort trying to devise a euphemism to soften
the shock.

In his Life of Andrew Jackson, Marquis James, after present-

ing detailed evidence in an attempt to prove that a “bargain™ did exist
between Adams and Clay, suitmarizes his evidence by sayings
Before coming to Washington, Clay hoped to be able to bring
about a situation whereby he could benefit himself by support
ing AdamsI upon his arrival there he assumed an attitude of
aloofness designed to put the Adams’ people on the anxious
arton, 0£, cit,, p, 571 In Worse’s biography of Adams, he
claims that Buchanan tried to pass the blame to a fictitious “Mr,
Markley,™ when confronted by Clay’s demand to know who had gone to Jack=
son as Clay’s representative, and when that ruse failed, that Buchanan
claimed that Jaekson had “misunderstood™ their conversation, (Morse,
op,cit,, p,
l 6 5 o )

56
seat and bring them to his terms| after which Mr. Adams met the
terms. The alternative is an assumption that Clay’s support of
Adams and Adams’s appointment of Clay were merely a c o i n c i d e n c e „ oO
In answer to Clay’s later claim that he had decided to back Adams
before leaving Kentucky, and that a bargain over that support in December
would therefore be most unlikely, James points out that if such a decision
had actually been made Clay kept it such a well=guarded secret that even
his most=trusted confidants were kept in the dark.

Clay carefully hid

his intentions to support Adams, James believes, until he had maneuvered
himself into a stronger political position -= i.e., when he could control
the votes of enough Congressmen to insure the election of Adams.

Accord

ing to this view. Clay’s cordial behavior toward Jackson was designed to
lead the General’s backers to hope that Clay would indeed support Jackson,
and Adams’ men to fear this, and therefore be more willing to "bargain.
Other historians, however, feel that Clay had never seriously
considered Jackson for the presidency. Furthermore, they reason that
Clay had decided to support Adams two months before the election, and had
revealed this choice to his friends.

To prove conclusively that Clay had

decided to back Adams even before the electors were chosen in the fall of
182U, Glyndon Van Deusen claims that John J. Crittenden, Colonel James
Davidson, and Francis P. Blair all heard Clay state that he would support
Adams if the election went to the House.

In addition. Van Deusen states

that Clay told Thomas Hart Benton early in December that he intended to
vote for Adams, and that he also revealed the same decision to Lafayette
later in the same month.
^Pjames, 0£. cit., p. 852.

^^Ibid.
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Clay’s reason for not announcing his intentions openly. Van
Densen maintains, was to avoid making ariy public proclamation before he
was able to ascertain the lay of the

Mallory thinks Clay failed

l a n d „ ^ 2

to reveal his decision? because he wanted to avoid the "unhealthy excite»
ment" generated by all caucuses and intrigues,
James, however, refuses to acknowledge that these earlier remarks
by Clay could be classified as commitments,

and maintains that they were

rather "tentative expressions which politicians less adroit than Henry
Clay repudiate with i m p u n i t y , I n addition, James points out that poli
tical secrets are traditionally so difficult to keep that the claim that
Crittendôn, Davidson, Blair, and the other Clay backers knew that Clay
would support Adamg' but kept this secret, tends to "impose a strain upon
credulity.

Furthermore, there is much evidence to show that Clay had

many reasons to back Jackson rather than Adair.s or Crawford, Unlike Craw
ford, Jackson had relatively good health, and a western view on the
tariff and internal improvements idiich corresponded to Clay’s, Also,
the differences between Clay and Jackson seemed to be heading toward an
adjustment, and Clay and Adams had fought each other as bitterly as Clay
and Jackson ever had.

Clay had opposed the most important measures of

Monroe’s administration, such as the Spanish treaty which was Adams’
pride, in a series of disputes which had grown out of the negotiations
at Ghent in l8lU,
^^Van Deusen, Clay, p, l8h,
^^Mallory,

cit., p. 129c

^^James, c£. cit., p. u2|.
65
Ibid., p , ul9o

58

In rebuttal to James, however, other historians insist that Clayhad ample reason for disliking Jackson and supporting Adams.

In the first

place. Clay is said to have felt that Adams was more qualified for the
presidency, in view of his extensive experience in governmental affairs.
With regard to Jackson's qualifications for the position. Clay wrote to
Blair that he could not see where “killing 2,500 Englishmen at New Orleans
qualified for the various, difficult and complicated duties of the Chief
Magistracy.That he disliked the puritanical Adams is not deniedj but
it is pointed out that he hated Adams less than he hated Jackson,and
chose him as the lesser of the two evils.

The long and checkered rela

tionship between Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay apparently began in the
fall of 1806.

Clay, then a Lexington lawyer, represented Jackson, then

a Nashville merchant, in a civil suit.^^ Clay's first extended personal
contact with Jackson came in the fall of I8l5, when the two met at Wash
ington. At this stage of development, the relationship was “marked with
cordiality on both sides,** with Jackson promising to spend a week visit
ing Clay the following summer, and writing a letter of regret when unable
to do so.70
The cordiality which characterized this meeting was not longlived. A few years later Clay denounced Jackson's role in the Seminole
war, particularly criticizing the treaty Jackson had forced upon the
^^Morse, 0£. cit., p. 171.
^^Van Deusen, Clay, p. 183.
^®Rosebo©m,
6 9

cit», P» 8U.

Bernard Mayo, Henry Clay (Boston, 1937), p. 95.

7^an Deusen, Clay, p. l8l.

Creeks in l8lU, the hanging of captured Indian chiefs, the executing of
Arbuthnot and Ambrister, and the seizure of St, Marks,

This attack,

which is said to have "earned for Henry Clay the hatred of a man who never
forgot and seldom forgave," marked the beginning of a long series of bit
ter clashes between the two men,^^ And the attack marked the first time
that Clay pointed to the danger of the triumph of a "military chieftain"
over civil authority.

Clay's reasons for attacking Jackson were appar

ently pure, but since both Clay and Jackson were considered presidential
aspirants, his motives were subject to suspicion,7^
Following his denunciation of Jackson in the House, Clay paid a
visit to him, but the call was not returned. When the two met at a
tavern in Kentucky the following summer, Jackson barely spoke to Clay,?^
In 1823, when both were rivals for the presidency, some of Jackson's
friends attempted to effect a reconciliation.

They explained to Clay

that Jackson's rudeness at the tavern meeting had been due to an illness
on the General's part.

Clay and Jackson then dined together several

times, and relations between them were temporarily

a m i c a b l e ,

Carl

Schurz has implied that the reason for the attempted conciliation at
this time was due to the fact that "Jackson himself thought it good
policy now to be on pleasant terms with Clay,"?^ James Parton, however.

"^4 b i d , , p ,

126,
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182,
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attributes it to Jackson’s extreme good humor due to his feeling that his
victory in the impending election was certain.

In fact, Parton points

out that at this time Jackson also effected reconciliations with several
other enemies of long-standing, among them General Winfield Scott and
Thomas Hart Benton.
Whatever the reason, the truce between the two was of short
duration, and "the embers of jealousy and dislike were smouldering,
ready to burst into f l a m e . T h e wind that fanned the spark came from
Clay’s announcement of his intentions of supporting Adams in the House
election, and the feud was reopened, to last until the day of Jackson’s
death.

In the words :f Carl Schurz:

"There was no fiercer hater than

Andrew Jackson, and no man whom he hated so fiercely as he did Henry
Clay.

That hatred was the passion of the last twenty years of his life."?^
Clay, too, had ample reason to dislike and refuse to support

Jackson.

In addition to Clay’s previously-mentioned fear of Jackson as

the "man on horseback,® there was little to unite the two men.

Clay was

certain that Jackson’s background did not qualify him to fill the highest
office in the land, and he doubted that Jackson really understood, much
less supported. Clay’s "American S y s t e m . A s early as 180U Clay had
opposed and defeated policies in the Kentucky legislature which later
came to be viewed as typically "Jacksonian.® Finally, Clay had good

76
Parton, 0£. cit., p. UU»
77
Tan Deusen, Clay, p. 182.
78
Schurz, 0£„ cit., p. 328.
79
Roseboam,
cit., p. 8 U.
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reason to fear Jackson as a political rival for the affections of the west.
It would be most unlikely for the Republican party to select a western
candidate to succeed a western president.

Those historians who hold to

this point of view see Clay as jealous of Jackson's popularity in the
west. And an all-western alliance with Jackson had already been anticifin
pated by another of Clay's rivals — John C. Calhoun.
Those who prefer
to think that Clay supported Adams because of his qualifications and views,
and not because of any hope of political reward, point out that Clay and
Adams had similar views on foreign affairs, internal inqjrovements, and
the tariff.

Clay felt that Jackson knew or cared little about these

affairs.
#

*

*

*

In most traditional historical accounts John Quincy Adams is pic
tured as a dedicated public servant.

Although possessed with a "gnawing”

ambition to become president, he would serve only if the people wanted
him, and never lower himself to beg for the job.

As early as March, I818,

Adams had decided not to seek the presidency openly.

He adhered to this

position so conçletely that the closest he came to becoming a campaigner
was to try to speak civilly.

By his own admission Adams was "reserved,

cold, austere ,t h e very opposite of the stereotyped politician.

He

even refused to purchase newspaper support or dispense offices for his
own personal advancement,
®%urner,

0£.

82 Adams is portrayed as so honest that he

cit., p.

261 .

^^inkley, 0£„ cit., p. 109.
82

Channing, o£. cit., p. 355■
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refused to speak to the Pennsylvania Germans in their own l^guage because
tte do so would be to “haranguei™ as willing to run again against Jackson
in 1825 if there was some question as to which candidate had the most
popular votes| as refusing to do anything to prevent federal office-holders
from attacking him after ne became president! and finally, as invariably
saying %oî“* to every ““doubtful™ suggestiono®^ This, then, is the tradi
tional picture of Adams the Candidates

““blunt, grim, almost rude „ „ „

ready to serve his country in any honorable capacity . . » puritanic,
austere, honest, and l o y a l » I t is indeed difficult to conceive of
such a man entering into any political "'bargain,™ whether ““corrupt™ or
not.
But other historians envision a very different Adams than the one
described in the above paragraph. Adams is described as determined not
to lower himself to struggle for the presidency, but is seen as being
driven by ambition to gradually weaken and enter the contest by degrees,
until he is finally plotting, negotiating, maneuvering, and bargaining as
much as any self-seeking politician.

Firm at first, but later far from

adamant, Adams® first concession to his ambition was an attempt to get rid
of his rivals by sending them out of the country on diplomatic missions.
He proposed foreign assignments for Clay, Calhoun, Clinton, and Jackson.®^
By the eve of the election of l82h, the solitary, austere, and Puritanical
Adams has suddenly become gregarious.
83lbid., p. 372.
^^Wrgess, op. cit., p. 132:
Turner, og. cit., p. 198.

““Never at any other time in his
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life did he make so many visits to Washington hotels and boarding houses,
calling on delegations in the House . . , and their friends. He did not
neglect a single chance of trying to win over a state to his supporte
Finally, Adams secured a working arrangement with a newspaper in Washing
ton, the National Journal, for which he obtained loans for its editors
87
and public printing for its columns»
In a sketch and summary of the political negotiations Adams
engaged in after undergoing the,iJekyll=Hyde transformation outlined
above, Samuel F, Bemis sees Adams ass

1) rewarding Daniel P» Cook, a

member of the House from Illinois, with a diplomatic junket to Cuba in
1827 for his support in the House electionj 2) assuring John Scott of
Missouri that Scott’s brother, who was in danger of losing his seat as
territorial judge for killing another member of the court, would remain
on the benchI 3) hinting broadly to Scott that Clay would be appointed
to a post in the next administration if the west supported Adams in the
House election^ li) telling the ex-Federalist friends of Daniel Webster
that the post of minister to England might go to Webster in exchange for
support for Adams| 5) promising Henry R„ Warfield of Maryland that the
Federalist party would not be proscribed by an Adams administrationg and
finally, 6) supporting Clinton in New York as the People’s party candi
date for governor, and for a foreign post in the coming administration,
in order to win Clinton’s partisans in the House,
®^emis, op. cit., p. 36.
^”^James, op. cit., p. 367.
88

Bemis, cp. cit., pp. Ul=U6 c
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Adams® pwitanie moral code was subjected to its greatest strain
during the pre-election negotiations between Adams and Robert P„
and between Adams and Clay himself.

L e t c h e r , ^9

Apparently the first meeting between

Adams and the Clay forces occurred on December 10, six days before the
final election returns arrived from Louisiana, and when the outcome was
still in doubt. Letcher called on Adams at the State Department, and
Adams returned the call on December 12, after the results of the popular
90
election were known.
The topics of conversation between the two men,
most naturally, were political conditions in Kentucky and the approaching
election.

On December 17 Letcher and Adams nad what was perhaps the most

important converaatibia cf their series of meetings.

Bringing the conver

sation around to the impending ejection, Letcher informed Adams of grow
ing Jackson strength in Kentucky, and mentioned the possibility that the
Kentucky legislature might eceatuaiiy instruct their delegation in the
House to Vote for Jackson. 9-i Letcner tten asked Adams what his attitude
toward Clay was, and was assured by Adams that he entertained no feeling
of hostility.

Letcner made no propositions; nor did he claim to represent

®^ashington, as the election in the House approached, was full
of '“busybodies“ who went from one candidate to another arranging meetings.
In fact, all of the leaders had "friends" and "quasi-managers'* who were
thus busily engaged. Whether these negotiators actually represented
their leaders is a point cf dispute. Buchanan, as we have seen, apparent
ly was operating entirely on his own, without the permission of either
Clay or Jackson. Apparently Adams himself felt that Letcher, a member of
the House from Kentucky and a room-mate of Clay, was acting on Clay's
behalf when meeting with Adams. for Adams made the observation that
"Letcher was moving for Clay." (Van Deusen, Clay, p. 18U)
^*^BeiTiis, ££. cit., p. 36,
^^an Deusen, Clay, p. l8 p.
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Clay.

Nevertheless, from the drift of their conversation, Adams came to

the conclusion that "Clay would willingly support me if he could thereby
serve himself, and the substance of his meaning was, that if Clay's
friends could know that he would have a prominent share in the Adminis
tration, that might induce them to vote for me, even in the face of in92

structionso"

Six days after this meeting, Letcher returned "with defi

nite and thinly-veiled proposals,in which he stressed the importance
to Adams of being picked on the first ballot.

Letcher was apparently

anxious to convince Adams that it might be possible for him to get the
vote of Kentucky.

To win on the first ballot, however, it would be

necessary for Adams to carry Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri,
and Louisiana — all states whicn everyone felt would go to Jackson un
less Clay intervened.

At the end of the meeting, Adams, the "master of

euphemism™^^ and clever diplomat, sent Letbher away with an answer which
was apparently not wholly satisfactory.

It was after this meeting that

Adams made the famous entry in his Diary: "Incedo super ignes" (I walk
over fire), which some observers take as evidence of his uneasy con95
science./^
It was necessary for Clay to talk to Adams himself, since
Letcher had received no “satisfactory" answer.

Accordingly, the two

men met at the New Tear’s day banquet given by congress in honor of
^^Ibid., pp. l8Ii-5.
93
James,
cit., p. 1+25.

9^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
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Lafayette, Whether they found themselves seated together by design or
by c h a n c e t h e y were on good terms.

Clay took the initiative and sug=

gested a laterj, private meeting, to lAich Adams agreed, requesting Clay
to fix the time.

It was on the eve of the meeting with Adams that Clay

penned a letter to Blair of Kentucky in which he announced his intentions
of supporting Adams,

In it he remarked that his decision was a "choice

of evils," and that he was obliged to back Adams because he was sure to
be elected anyway, since he was second choice in three of four Crawford
states, and since it looked as if Ohio was

leaning towards Adams,

For

Kentucky to oppose Ohio, Clay felt, would be to divide friends,
The evening of January 9 Clay called on Adams, and in a threehour conversation "they went over their past differences, their present
views, and their expectations for the f u t u r e , D u r i n g the course of
the discussion. Clay apparently gave Adams the impression that he had
remained neutral thus far in the campaign because of his recent candi
dacy, and because he wanted his friends to have an impartial choice,
Adams records that Clay wished to be reassured on "some principles of
great public importance, but without any personal considerations,"^9
After Adams® position was made clear. Clay "presumably® said he would
come out for Adams,

100
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Clay expected from his previous talks w i % Letcher, and that "Clay con
cluded, without explicit assurances, that he could have any situation in
the new Cabinet that he

w a n t e d .

"^^1

Adams has described this meeting in a letter to William Plumer
Jr.

But Plumer guessed that Adams did not tell all, and "did not think

it decorous to enquire more particularly == nor did Mr. Adams seem dis
posed to say anything further of what passed between t h e m . N o r can
the inquiring historian go to that fountain of information — Adams'
"Diary" — to find out what transpired at the meeting, for, as Bemis
says:
Adams's Diary breaks off exasperatingly at this point. He left
a blank space to write up later. It remains blank to this day.
The scrupulous editor of his Memoirs |~his son, Charles Francis
Adam^ explains that the extreme pressure of business and visits
(which was certainly enormous at this time) prevented the diarist
from filling it in — and this one of the most important conver
sations that he ever had in his lifeg When John Quincy Adams
dropped his Diary in such an important matter as this, he let
his conscience slip. Incedo super ignes? ^
Whether the negotiations between Clay and Adams constituted a
"gentleman's agreement," an "implicit bargain," an "entente cordial,"
or a "corrupt bargain" has been and still remains a speculative delight
of American history scholars.

^^^emis,
cit., p. UO.
10?
Van Deusen, Clay, p. 186<
103
Bemis,
cit., p. LO.

CHAPTER IV
THE E^IDENÜE IN THE ADAMS' PAPERS
C©saflicting historical interpretations of the “corrupt bargain"
of I82U are of ancient vintage.

The recent release of the Adams' docu=

ments by the Adams Trust and the Massachusetts Historical Society, how
ever, has once again rekindled interest in the problem.

Up until the

release of the Adams' papers, scholars had to rely upon Charles Francis
Adams' Memoirs of John Quincy Adams^ as the most conplete "eye-witness"
view of the critical "negotiations" between Adams and Clay on the eve of
the election in the House of Representatives,

But Charles Francis, while

a "scrupulous editor," was nevertheless an Adams — indeed, the son of
John Quincy -= and there has been some speculation as to how much and
what kind of material had been rearranged or deleted during the editing
process. Access to the actual papers in their original form, particu
larly John Quincy Adams' "Diary"^ itself, becomes of the utmost ir^ortance to the scholar, especially in any discussion of the significance of
the omissions from, as well as the inclusions in, the "Diary,"
To answer the question immediately:

there seems to be little

Charles Francis Adams, The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Com
prising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1BIT8, (Philadelphia, 187C=7) 9
12 vols. Hereafter referred to as Memoirs,
Berais, ap, cit., p, UO,
^See the Appendix (Page 102) for a discussion of the three
"Diaries" that make up the "Diary" of the Memdlrs,
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evidence of intentional bias revealed by an examination of the Memoirs
and a comparison with the original “Diary® which was used to compile them,
during the vital period (so far as this thesis is concerned) from Decem
ber, I82U to March, 182$. Any differences that do exist between the
original “Diary® and the text of the Memoirs seem to be primarily errors
of a clerical nature, or intentional changes designed to make reading
easier, including modernized punctuation and spelling.
If we assume the material included in the Memoirs to be basically
accurate, then we must further assume the previous accounts which were
written with the Memoirs as a major reference to be accurate .also. How
then is there anj difference of opinion among historians as to the vali
dity of the “corrupt bargain® charge? Because there is ample evidence
in the Memoirs that there was a bargain — but also an^le evidence that
there was not.

It is in the recently released private and public corres

pondence sent and received by the Adams family that new evidence has now
become available — and much of it indicates that there was indeed a
“bargain® between Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams,
Thus the most logical method of attacking the problem is to rely
primarily upon what was included in the “Diary,® whether present in the
Memoirs or not, and to pay particular attention to correspondence and
various miscellaneous sources in the Adams papers to supplement any gaps.
Approaching the situation from this standpoint, it is possible to test
and determine the relative validity of three different historical inter
pretations of the “corrupt bargain,™
view of the affair can be stated thus?

(a) The “traditional® historical
was Adams a moralistic Puritan
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who by nature and training would never enter into any type of political
negotiations, not to mention a "corrupt bargain," but whose own honesty
and naivete, coupled with the slanderous malice of the Jackson and drawford supporters, led him to commit a political blunder of the first mag
nitude?

(b) The more "modern" historical view, (but which is based at

least in part on the “traditional" approach), is:
a moralistic Puritan,

granted that Adams was

but was he a Puritan whose moral code broke down

under the pressure of amibition until he negotiated with the rest of the
politicians, even to making "bargains for their support?

(c) Finally,

the problem stated simply and succinctly by many observers:

did the

series of meetings between Adams and Clay lead to Clay's support of
Adams in the House election and Adams' subsequent appointment of Clay as
Secretary of State?

In answering this latter question, no attempt should

be made to determine the moral implications of the Clay-Adams talks| nor
to determine whether a “bargain," if it can be said to have existed, was
actually "corrupt," because such a solution is primarily semantic in
nature and not historicalo
a.
The "traditional" view is apparently in large part based on
Adams' own protestations of his innocence and refusal to campaign (in the
ordinary sense of the word) during the election.

These protestations are

amply scattered through the Memoirs.
Representative of this view is a conversation between Adams and
General Jacob Brown, Commander of the Army, on December l5, l82li. In the
entry in his "Diary® for this date, Adams related how, when he had been
encouraged by Brown to try to cultivate friendly relations with DeWitt
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Clinton of New York with the object of gaining Clinton's support by offer
ing him a place in the new administration, he had replied that the forma
tion of an administration must take into consideration not only political
factors, but “all the great public interests»Again, in a later conver
sation with Daniel Webster, Adams recorded his refusal to solicit the
support of the Federalists by allowing Webster to inqply that a place in
the administration would have been given to some Federalist»^ Even sifter
his election by the House of Representatives, Adams criticized the prin
ciple of rotation in office (in the “Diary,maintaining that it would
“make the government a perpetual and unremitting scramble for office.
In another part of the entry for the very same day, Adams claimed that
he was “determined to renominate every person, against whom there was no
complaint Wilch warrant his removal.“ As if to illustrate this resolu
tion, Adams refused to remove Allan McLane as collector at Wilmington,
Delaware, because the complaints against him were “indefinite.
Another bit of evidence which indicates that Adams was indeed
unwilling to bargain for votes, even if it meant the loss of the election,
is revealed in a letter from Albert H. Tracy to Adams written December 17,

18380® At the time of the election, Tracy was a member of the lower House
^John Quincy Adams, “Rubbish III,™ The Adams Papers, Part I
(Boston, 195U)s) Microfilm reel number 5l, December 15, 182U.
^John Quincy Adams, “Diary in Abridgement,™ The Adams Papers,
Part I (Boston, 195^), Mcrofilm<Nel number 36, entry for February 3,
l825o
^“Diary in Abridgement,™

cit., March 5, 1825»

?Ibid.
®“Letters Received and Other Loose Papers,™ The Adams Papers,
Part IV, (Boston, 1959), Microfilm reel number 5lO, December 10, 1838.
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from New York.

The letter asked Adams to verify some facts pertaining

to a conversation between Adams and Daniel P- Cook, (member of the House
from Illinois), which took place on the eve of the H@use election.

Cook's

vote was particularly critical because, as the only member from Illinois,
he could determine how the State's entire vote would be cast.

Yet, accord

ing to Tracy's recollection of the event, Adams would not permit Cook to
misinterpret Adams' intentions to Cook's constituents in order to justify
Cook's support of Adams.

In the letter, Tracy went on to recall the sub

stance of a conversation he had with Cook the day after Cook had discussed
the matter with Adams.

Cook indicated that he was hesitant to vote for

Adams if Adams intended to offer the treasury post to Crawford because of
the extreme hostility to Crawford in Illinois. Wien Cook asked Adams to
contradict a rumor then circulating in Illinois to the effect that Adams
was contemplating offering the Treasury position to Crawford, by asking
Adams to say that he had never "expressed such an intention," Adams was
said to have agreed to this, but refused to obtain support for his elec
tion by a misinterpretation of his views.

By Tracy's memory, Adams had

told Cook that although he could safely deny that he had "expressed" any
intention of nominating Crawford, the denial would have led Cook's con
stituents to suppose that Adams had not entertained such an intention.
And this would have been misleading, for Adams had indeed entertained
such an intention, and had been determined to carry it into effect if
elected.

Tracy then continued to say that the end result of Adams'

honesty was to make it impossible for Cook to promise to support him —
a fact which "exceedingly vexed" Tracy and several other Adams supporters.
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although Ccok eventually voted for Adams and Adams eventually appointed
Crawford,?
The conversations between Cook and Adams which were recorded in
the "Diary" indicate that Adams’ main concern at that time was to secure
from Cook a written testimony to the effect that Cook had been approached
by Samuel D, Ingham, member of the House from Pennsylvania, George McDuf
fie, member of the House from South Carolina, and Judge J„ C„ Isaacs of
Tennessee, with the view of coercing Cook into supporting Jackson,

Cook

reported to Adams that in the course of the conversation he had been
told by McDuffie that Adams and Clay had made a "corrupt bargain," and
that Cook could prevent it from going into effect by throwing his sup
port behind Jackson,

Cook denied that the whole election was in his

hands; demanded to see any evidence of a "bargain" between Adams and
Clay; and stated his determination not to commit himself to any parti
cular candidate, but rather to vote in "the best interests of the coun
try," McDuffie then warned Cook that the blame for any Western state
that went for Adams would be shifted onto his shoulders, because without
Cook’s consent they would net vote for Adams,

McDuffie then predicted a

great storm of opposition to be organized against the Adams administra
tion which would terminate it after four years, and Ingham foresaw the
growth two new political parties based on the results of the election.
Cook then answered that the party he would join would depend
judgement as the-probable opinion of

constituents," and that he

thought he would act against the Jackson party,
^Crawford declined the appointment.

on his "own

Ingham replied that at

7U
the end of fom» years Jackson would ccsne into the presidency, by an over-

whelming vote of the people, and

Clay and Mr. Adams would be pros-

10
trated and driven out."

After the seriousness of the "corrupt bargain" charge became
apparent to Adams, he requested Cook on February 5, 182$, to put the
record of this conversation with Ingham, McDuffie, and Issacs on record,
because "all this would be history hereafter, and that those conversa-

11

tions would be an important part of history. “

Cook agreed, and on

February 2$, gave his account of the meeting to Adams
One of the most interesting of Adams® statements of his moral
position with regard to political bargaining to gain election was an
article entitled "The Macbeth Policy."

This article was written in

January, 1823,^^ the same month in which Adams was nominated for the
presidency, and reads in part as follows:
An ingenious commentator upon Shakespear sic~| in a con
versation by Moonlight on the Piazza observes that "The Macbeth
policy" — "If chance will have me king, why chance may crown
me," will not answer —
A friend who happens at the moment when this observation
is made, to join in the conversation, and who sometimes studies
the Tragedy of Macbeth, with a view to the first and highest
purposes of the Drama, to purify his own heart by the Passions
of Pity and Terror, enquires whether this quotations
ohn Quincy Adams, "Miscellany," The Adams Papers, Part III,
(Boston, I956), Microfilm reel number 2$6, January 21, l82$„
^^"Diary, "
cit., reel 36, February $, 182$.
1?
Ibid., February 2$, 182$.
13
Bemis says Adams wrote "The Macbeth Policy" to Joseph Hop
kins, whom Bemis refers to as “a distinguished Philadelphia lawyer and
member of the committee of fcreign affairs in the House of Representa
tives," (Bemis, og. cit., p. I9).
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“If Chance will have me king, why chance may crown me
without ray stir.“
can with propriety be denominated “The Macbeth Policÿ“? And
whether it is not rather a remnant of Virtue yet struggling in
the breast of that victim of unhallowed ambition, against the
horrible imaginings of that policy by which he finally wins
the Crown, and loses his life and his soul?
As a tail to this enquiry let us suppose that Macbeth had
adhered to what you call his policy and waited for Chance to
crown him. You say he never would have been king? True =■= and
Of course no Tragedy» The Macbeth policy is quite a different
thing, and your quotation is an answer to your argument»
But in the application of the sentiment to present times
and future events, ought we not to remark that kings and crowns
and chance are all out of the question? Detur digniori^^^
is the inscription upon the prize, and the choice of ten mil
lions of people by their delegated agents must award it»
*No“ say you, “little is left to chance or merit, the
prize is awarded by politicians and newspapers "and the man who
sits down waiting for it by chance or just right, will go bare
headed all his life»"
Here we come to the point — the principle of the Consti
tution in its purity is, that the duty shall be assigned to
the most able and the most worthy — Politicians and newspapers
may bestir themselves to point out who that is| and the only
question between us, is, whether it be consistent with the
duties of a citizen, who is supposed to desire that the choice
should fall upon himself, to assist, countenance and encourage,
those who are disposed to befriend him in the pursuit.
The Law of Friendship is a reciprocation of good offices —
he who asks or accepts the offer, of friendly service, contracts
the obligation of meeting it with a suitable return =■= He who
asks or accepts the offer of aid to promote his own views of him
from iAom he received it? Wiatever may be the wishes of an in
dividual, nothing but the unbiased voice of many others can make
him ever a Candidate for the chief magistracy» If he asks or
accepts the aid of one, he must ask or accept the aid of multi
tudes. Between the principle of which much has been said pajT]
the newspapers, that a President of the United States must re
member those to whom he owes his election and the principle of
accepting no ^ d on the score of friendship or personal kind
ness to him, there is no alternative » The former as it has been

^^»let it be given to the more worthy"
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anncnmced and urges, I deem to be essentially and vitally cor
rupt, The latter is the only principle to which no exception
can be taken,^5
Another insight into Adams® moral attitudes, in this case toward
the

function of a “diary“ in a personas life, is revealed in a letter he

wrote to his son, George Washington Adams, on November 28, 1827, in which
he says 8
A man who commits to paper from day to day the employment of his
time, the places he frequents, the persons with whom he converses,
the actions with which he is occupied, will have a perpetual guard
over himself. His record is a second conscience. He will fly
from worthless associates and from dishonest deeds, to avoid the
alternative of becoming a self-accuser or of falsifying by the
suppressio veri^P his own testimony to his own actions, I will
appeal to yourself whether your interruptions in your diary, ac
cording as you have kept or neglected it have not been most fre
quently owing to a sense of shame, anunwillingness to put upon
the record time worse than wasted, and actions of which you was
ashamed,Ï7
This statement of principle assumes seme significance when the
“gaps® in John Quincy Adams® own "diary" are taken into consideration,
b.
Later historians, perhaps more sophisticated, have refused to
accept Adams® protestations of morality at f^e value, maintaining instead
that he not only was capable of entering into political negotiations to
further his own cause, but that he did enter these negotiations fully.
aware of the moral implications of his actions.

According to this point

of view, there is much evidence that Adams dealt not only with Clay but
^^John Quincy Adams, “Letterbook," The Adams Papers Part II,
(Boston, 19$S), Microfilm reel number lii7, January 23, 1823,
^^"suppression of the truth (is) suggestion of the false"
17
"Letterbook," o£, cU,, reel li;6, November 28, 1827.
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with many other political figures on the eve of the House election.

The

assumption follows, that if Adams was capable of dealing with these others,
he was capable of dealing with Clay.

The diaries and letters in the Adams

papers reveal that John Quincy Adams held frequent and extended conversa
tions with mai^ political leaders during the period immediately preceding
the election in the Honse of Representatives.

The conversations which

were recorded in these documents seem to indicate that Adams was solicit
ing the support of men in key states by giving them the impression that
he was willing to grant them concessions of a political nature.
In order to win in the House, it was necessary for Adams to carry
the votes of the six New England states, as well as Maryland, Ohio, Ken
tucky, Illinois, Missouri, Louisiana, and New York.

To do this, Adams

had to obtain the votes of such westerners as John H. Scott of Missouri
and D. P. Cook of Illinois, who alone would determine their state's
votesI and in addition, the support of certain ex-Federalists, such as
Daniel "Webster and John Reed of Massachusetts, and Louis McLane of
Delaware.

The division in New York was so close that any weakening of

the anti-Adams coalition in that state would probably give its vote to
Adams.
We have seen how Adams maintained that he refused to solicit
Cook's vote, in spite of its importance.

The situation with regard to

Scott of Missouri appears in a slightly different light, however. As
early as December 11, Judge Nathaniel Pope had forwarded to Adams an
analysis of Scott's character, and a discussion of the possiblity of
obtaining Scott's vote for Adams in case the election went to the
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H o u s e O n e week later Adams called on Monroe with letters recommending
Scott's brother, Andrew, for appointment as Governor of Arkansas Terri
tory,

Monroe replied that the Attorney General had informed him that

Andrew Scott should be removed from his office as judge in Arkansas be
cause he had recently killed a colleague in a duel, and "could hardly
therefore just at this time be appointed Governor of the Territory,
Soon after, Edward Wyer called on Adams to talk about Scott's hostility
20

to AdamsÎ

and on January 10, Scott himself visited Adams to talk

"about the appointment of a governor of Arkansas," although Adams gives
no indication of the conversation, except to say that Scott would call
again,21

By the time Scott and Adams had their next recorded meeting,

on JanËÈy 21, Scott "gave ]~~Adams~| a list of the Printers whom he
wished to have appointed for printing the Laws in Missouri » , ,"^2
tone of this letter requesting the appointments (which is not included
in the Memoirs) is provocative in that it seems that Scott is telling
Adams, rather than requesting Adams to make the appointments, Be^nningj^
"will you please to appoint as Public Printers in the; State of Missouri
,
iBnfLgtters Received and other Loose Papers,"
December 11, 182U,

cit,, real U66,

^^"Rubbish," op, cit,, reel 5l, December 18, l82b, (Bemis iden
tifies %-er as "formerly'*consul at Riga during Adams's mission in Russia,
and later in Hamburg, one time agent for claims in Santo Domingo, and
occasional dispatch-bearer for the Department of State, seems to have
been the Secretary of State's confidential leg-man about town," Bemis,
op, cit., p. 2U)«
20
"Rubbish,® o£o cit,, reel 5*1, December 31, 182L.
^^Ibid,, January 10, 182$,
22

"Diary in Abridgement,"

cU,, reel 36, January 21, 182$,
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the following papers or persons o o o

Scott then lists the three

papers and their editors, with no mention of their qualifications or any
other justification for their selection, in marked contrast to the con
tents and style of many other letters soliciting appointments that were
received by Adams during this p e r i o d » I n his conversation with Adams,
Scott explained that he had originally held some animosity towards Adams
because he had several years before given government printing to a news
paper which was opposed to Scott» After Adams assured Scott that this
appointment was purely unintentional, the matter of the proposed firing
of Scott’s brother was briefly discussed by the two men»

Adams assured

Scott that since the application for firing had been made the previous
summer, and since no action had been taken on it, the matter would
probably be dropped»Then the conversation turned to the approaching
election, and Scott said that he had decided to vote with the other wes
tern delegations, and expressed the hope that Clay would be made a mem
ber of the next administration» Adams replied that "he would not expect
me to enter upon details with regard to the formation of an administra
tion, but that if I should be elected by the suffrages of the West, I
should naturally look to the West for much of the support that I should
need»" Upon this remark, Scott “’parted from |~~Adam^ apparently satis
fied»"^^ Scott must have thought over the propriety of the conversation
with Adams, for the following day he called again "to say that he had
^^"Letters Received and other Loose Papers," op» cit», reel U6?,
January 21, l82^»
2U"Diary in Abridgement," op» cit», reel 36, January 21, 182$»
^^bid»
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been under some apprehension from what he had said yesterday, that I might
consider him as having been disposed to prescribe conditions or make bar
gains. “ Adams assured him that he had not understood their talk in that
sense.

Scott then went on to say that he had not meant to speak posi

tively, because he had not made up his mind as to how he should vote,
except that he thought it best to act with his friends. Adams then wryly
commended in the "Diary" that "this apprehension that he had spoken yes
terday too positively is characteristic — Scott means to vote with the
strongest side."^^
Another important block of votes in the approaching House elec
tion was in the hands of the ex-Federalists, led by Daniel Webster,

On

December lU, William Plumer, Jr., of New Hampshire, called on Adams to
report that Webster was "panting for the mission to L o n d o n , A month
later Plumer repeated to Adams the fact of Webster’s ambition to go as
Minister to England.

Daring this conversation, Adams observed that such

ambition "might be gratified hereafter, but not immediately."^® On Janu=
ary 21, John Reed came to talk to Adams "about Webster, Louis McLane, and
the federalists," expressing Webster’s apprehension that Adams would
clude the Fadai'alists from office if elected.

ex

Adams assured Reed, however,

that he "should exclude no person for political opinions, or for personal
opposition" to h i m . j j j ^ conversation with Henry Clay about this time^
Ibid., January 22, l82^.
2 7

"Rubbish," o£. cit., reel 5^1, December lU, l8Sh.
28
"Diary in Abridgement,"
cit., reel 36, January 17, 182$.
29
"Diary in Abridgement," o£. cU., reel 36, January 21, 182$.
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Adams became aware that the Kentuckian was '"ainclons for the conciliation
of Webster and Louis McLane o'® Adams reported that he told Clay “the
source of Webster's anxieties^ and my own earnest desire to conciliate
him, the manner in which my overtures had been received by him, and my
own high opinion of his talents and capacities for service

Finally,

on February 3, Webster himself :ailed on Adams and spent the evening
talking about the election»

He read a letter to Adams from Henry R„

Warfield, member of the House from Maryland, in which Warfield had asked
Webster how to vote, Webster then showed Adams an answer in which Web
ster expressed the belief that Adams would not proscribe the Federalists,
and instructed Warfield tc vote for him, pointing out that Adams would
confer “some one prominent ^cpcintment upon a person of that party,**
Adams objected to the last provision, saying that if it referred to the
formation of an Administration, it would imply more than I could confirm,"
Webster, however, assured him that it did not, "but to the appointment
perhaps of a judge,™ Adams then "approved altogether of the general
spirit of his a n s w e r , H e r e we have evidence that Adams was beginning
to feel that a little "immorality™ might be acceptable == a judge perhaps,
but not a member of the cabinet?

Upon departing, Webster remarked that

Stephen Van Rensaelaer, member of the House from New York, "entertained
similar sentiments to his own, and by his advice would call on | Adams~|
at eleven o'clock," the fallowing morning,
January iy, 1625,
^^bid,, February 3, l82Uo
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"When Van Rensselaer arrived, he spoke to Adams "much in the same
manner as ¥ebster had done," and Adams "answered him in the same manner,
and as he said, entirely tc» his satisfaction»"

Van Rensselaer then

turned the discussion to the sorry plight of one Solomon Van Rensselaer
of Albany, New York, who was reported to be a "very indent'Supporter" of
Adams, but whose appointment as postmaster at Albany had been opposed by
Van Buren»

Adams assured Van Rensselaer that he "thought Van Buren had

been wrong" in his opposition, because, although Van Buren was "a man of
great talents and good principles," he "had suffered them to be too much
warped by party s p i r i t . T h i s conversation might go further to explain
Van Rensselaer®s vote for Adams in the House election than the "heavenly
sign" theory previously discussed.
Warfield, too, called on Adams.

He told Adams that he had not

yet “decided whom to support in the coming election, but that he had been
urged to vote for Jackson because it was being rumored that an Adams
administration "would be conducted on the principle of proscribing the
federal party. " Adams ass'ired Warfield, however, that he would never
proscribe any party, and had "always done justice to the talents and ser
vices of the individuals composing" the Federalist party. Warfield then
"declared himself perfectly satisfied™ with this expression of Adams'
sentiments.'^
In addition to these observations, which indicate that Adams
entered into political negotiations at this time with the object of
^%bid., February u, 1825.
3h
Ibid., February 7, 1825,
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inprovlng his position in the coming Honse election, there are numerous
other brief exchanges appearing in the “Diary" and the letters of the
period which substantiate this point of view.

For example, Adams called

on Van Buren, to tell him “that I believe the young man recommended by
him for the appointment of Consul at Sant Tago of Chili, Daniel li^ne,
would be nominated! but perhaps not till after the election in the
House,“35 And, in an earlier conversation with General Brown, Adams had
exhibited a similar tendency, when Brown suggested that Adams might
develop an understanding with Clinton, and expressed the desire that
Clinton might enjoy a position in the next administration.

On that occa

sion, Adams refused to tell Brown how he would form his administration
in case he were elected, but assured the General that Clinton already
kp'ew of Adams' opinion of his talents, and that it was for Clinton to
"determine how far it might be for his interest to maintain towards
CAdam^

the attitude of a competitor, or otherwise."36

During the period preceding the election in the House, Adams
received much advice from well-wishers on how to succeed in politics.
For example, James TaHmadge, then a member of the New York legislature,
suggested a diplomatic appointment for Henry"Wheaton,^® a New York
^^Ibid., February 1, 1825.
3^"Rubbish,"

cit., reel 5l, December l5, l82i|.

^^Bemis identifies Tallmadge as having "gone back to the New York
legislature after having made his one bright mark in history by introduc
ing the amendment for restrictions of slavery in the proposed new state
of Missouri." (Bemis,
cit., p. 22).
3®Bemis identifies Wieaton as a "youthful journalist and jurist
of New York City, subsequently to win renown as a diplomat and inter
national lawyer." (Bemis, 0£„ cit., p. 22).
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journalist and jurist, because Wheaton '“has been useful, in our late
struggles to sustain ourselves in this state»™

Tallmadge then went on

to point out that Wheaton "ought to be sustained for further usefulness,**
and suggested a post in Brazil or

M e x i c o

»^^

another letter of this

type, Peter Paul Francis Degrand^O urged Adams to try to cultivate poli=
tical friends, pointing out how Adams had enraged L» W» Tazewell, Senator
from Virginia, by arguing with him over the quality of wine at a dinner,
"Thus, my dear sir, you see that you must look out,** wrote Degrand, **even
for your Tokay wine -= the smallest and most insignificant shoal may
shipwreck the ablest mariner, if he does not know of it — but now I have
pointed it out, it will be very easy to place Tazewell in the right chan
nel, for swallowing his Tokay » » , his notions about Old States may be
exceedingly useful just at this tlrne™^ The last phrase refers to an
earlier remark by Tazewell that Virginia and New England should move to
gether to spurn the idea of "irqsotent, half-civilized New States ruling
over th@ Old Reputable S t a t e s , A n d one "C, H» W a r r e n , a l s o
^^**Letters Received and other Loose Papers,™ o£, cit», reel U66,
December 2U, I82I4.0
^^Berais identifies Degrand as a "republican emigre of the French
Revolution," and in a footnote on the same page, says Degrand detailed
politifal trends and personalities in Massachusetts and New England in a
numbered series of some 175 personal letters to John Quincy Adams between
1817 and 1825, Adams wrote him only half a dozen non-commital answers,
and stopped replying to him when he realized what he was up to,** (Bemis,
op, cit,, p, 22) Bemis, however, does not reveal what Degrand **was up to»*
^ “Letters Received and other Loose Papers,** 0£» cit,, reel U66,
December 27, I82I4.,

^^Ibid,
^^o identification of Warren could be discovered.
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approached Adams to “urge his application for the appointment of collec
tor at New Bedford, which he thinks is a case of life and death to the
Republican party in that District»“

Even John Adams recommended

“honest Spafford™ for a job because “he has so much merit in his New York
Gazetteer that I wish something could be done for him»
Adams® professed determination not to take political factors into
consideration when making appointments was apparently forgotten in the
period immediately following the election»

On March 5, after extensively

criticizing the system of rotation in office, he announced his refusal
to appoint Thomas Hart Benton as Minister to Mexico because Benton had,
“from being a furious personal and political enemy of Gen'l Jackson be
came about the time of this recommendation, a partizan not less ardent in
his f a v o u r » A n d in the very next paragraph Adams announced his inten
tion of appointing Rufus King as Minister to England (in spite of Adams*
veiled promise to Webster), observing that among the reasons for King's
selection was "the satisfaction which the appointment and his acceptance
of it would give to the federal party throughout the Union»
All that these numerous instances of Adams* willingness to “bar
gain® to gain political advantage for himself may prove is that he was
capable of entering into such negotiations, and not that he actually did
negotiate with Clay»

Only a direct examinâtian tf the evidence can

^ “Diary in Abridgement,™ ^ » cit», reel 36, February 8, 1825°
“Letters Received and other Loose Papers,“ op» cit», reel U68,
March 2, 1825°
~
"Diary in Abridgement,“ op» ci^», reel 36, March 5, 1825°
^■Ibid»
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indicate whether such negotiating ^

take place, and whether they could

be considered as designed to put Adams in the White House and Clay in the
State Departmento
Co

On December 11, Adams received a letter from Joseph E» Sprague,
who at the time was the Postmaster at Salem, Massachusetts, and "an
aspirant for the collectorship af customs t h e r e I n the letter,
Sprague sagely observed that in eight years both Jackson and Crawford
would be too old for the presidency, but that Clay would not| and also
that Clay could have much difficulty in following a western president
because he was also from the west.

He then advised Adams to cultivate

Clay"8 friendship, because "his appointment to an important department
by you" would secure his election j.ater, and give Adams’ administration
the support of the West, also taking into account that Clay had "more
friends among the Republicans vf New England than any other candidate»
On the day preceding the receipt of the letter from Sprague,
Adams had been paid a visit by Robert. ?» Letcher.

No record of their

conversation can be found in the "diary," but two days later,Adams re
turned the call.

He reports that during this visit Letcherg

spoke to me much of the internal politics of Kentucky^ of the
convulsed interior of the state; on the question of breaking
the Judges for pronouncing the Laws impairing the obligation
of contracts; of the leading men in the state opposed to Mr.
Clay, though professing to be his friends
of the senti
ments of his own Constituents, upon the Presidential elec
tion; and their preference of a candidate next to Mr. Clay.
ii8

Bemis,

cit., p. 22.

U9

"Letters Received and other Lcose Papers," op. cit., reel U66,
December 11, iBPp.

He said it was rumoured also that the legislature would in
struct the members from the State how to veteg but intimated
that he should not consider himself bound by instructions
from them
Clay was present at this meetiMg, but limited his remarks to
some observations on a grant to be given to General Lafayette.
Edward "Vfyer then called on Adams in his office in the State De
partment, and told him that “he had it from good authority that Mr. Clay
was much disposed to support me if he could at the same time be useful
to h i m s e l f . T h a t evening Clay and Adams “had conversation at dinner,
but Adams did not record the topic of the talk. %rer repeated the story
again the following day — that Clay would support Adams in return for
support for himself, but when Adams asked him for the source of his infor
mation, Wyer “could not give

Adams'] his author.

At this point Robert Letcher returned again to see Adams, “osten
sibly with a claim . . . but his apparent main object was to talk about
the presidential election.® Of this visit, Adams observed:
Mr. Letcher is an intimate friend of Mr. Clays® and lodges at
the same house with him. He expects that after the result is
known that Mr. Clay cannot be voted for in the house, there
will be meetings of the people in the several counties, in
structing their members to vote for Jackson; and perhaps that
similar instructions will be sent on by their legislature . . .
Letcher is evidently alarmed at this, and in the midst of
^^“Rubbish, “ 0£. cit., reel ^1, December 12, I82I4..
^^bid., December 15, I82U0

^^Ibid.
S3
Ibid., December 16, I82U. Also on
ceived at Washington that Louisiana had gone
would therefore be excluded from the list of
would go before the House of Representatives

December 16, news was re
for Jackson — that Clay
three candidates ihlch
for final selection.
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strong professions of independence, and of indifference about
retaining his seat, is plainly not prepared to act defini
tively in opposition to the will of his constituents —= He in
timated that . o o of the Kentucky delegation here, a large
portion were warmly attached to him Clay == that lately
speaking of what might ensue here, he had expressed the wish
to go in harmony with his friendsj which Letcher said he in|terpreted as a wish that his friends would go in harmony with him
o o o Letcher wished to know what my sentiments towards Clay
were; and I told him without disguise that I harboured no
hostility against him ■== that whatever of difference there had
been between us had arised altogether from him and not from me.
0 , 0 Letcher said » . * he was sure Clay felt now no hostility
to me. He had spoken respectfully of me, and was a man of sin
cerity o o o the drift of all Letcher®s discourse was much the
same as Wyer had told me, that Clay would willingly support me,
if he could thereby serve himself, and the substance of his
meaning was that if Clay's friends could know that he would
have a prominent share in the Administration, that might in
duce them to vote for me, even in the face of Instructions „ . ,
but Letcher did not profess to have any authority from Clay for
what he said, and he made no definite proposition. He spoke of
his interview with me as altogether confidential, and in ry
answers to him I spoke in mere general terms. .
Still another meeting between the two men was not recorded by
Adams; but on December 23, they had a conversations
upon the subject which he j^Letche^ broached the other day
. . „ the object of Letcher appeared to me to be, to convince
me of the importance of obtaining an Election in the House of
Representatives, at the first ballot; and that it would be
obtainable; by securing the votes of the states of Kentucky,
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Louisiana — I told him
candidly that however desirable this might be, it would be
utterly impracticable; and that I had no expectation of receiv
ing the vote of his own State of Kentucky — he seemed anxious
to convince me that I might receive it, and enumerated the
whole delegation, stating how each of them was now disposed —
a majority of them being uncommitted — I consider Letcher as
moving for Mr. Clay; and this anxiety of a friend of Clay's
that I should obtain the election at the first ballot in the
House is among the whimsical results of political combination
at this time, “Incedo super ignes."55
5Uitid., December 17, 182U,
^%bid., December 2?, 182U.
quotation ï s ^ wal]k over fires. ‘

The literal translation of the Latin
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Several times more they conferred, Letcher again expressed con
fidence that Adams would get the vote of Kentucky in the House of Repre
sentatives, “though he expected instructions from the Legislature of the
State to vote for Jackson,
On January 1, 1825, Letcher informed Adams that?
the members of the Kentucky Legislature would in their private
capacities and not by Legislative act, recommend to the members
from the-State in the House to vote for General Jackson as
President, and popular meetings to pass similar resolutions had
been and would be got up — but I j^ d a m ^ might rely upon it
they would have no effect. The vote of Kentucky in the House
was fixed and unalterable , , , He spoke of the difference be
tween Mr, Clay and me as giving concern to seme of the members
of the delegation, and intimated a wish that I should have some
conversation with Mr, Clay, upon the subject, I told him I
would very readily, and whenever it might suit the convenience
of Mr, Clay,2?^
That evening, lAen Adams attended a dinner given by Congress in
honor of General Lafayette, Clay told him that he wanted to have “some
confidential conversatioms upon public affairs“ with Adams, who replied
that he “would be happy , , , whenever it might suit , , , | Clay's |
convenience.
In the “Diary" immediately following the above notation, Adams
has the following inscriptions

"At the beginning of this year, there is

in my prospects and anticipations a solemnity, and moment, never before
experiencedg and to which unaided nature is i n ad e qu at e, Di d Adams
W
expect Clay to “aid nature® in the way he had forseen in “The Macbeth
Policy?"
^^bid,, December 29, 182U,
57fflDiary,“

S^Ibid.
5%Ibid,

cit,, reel 39, January 1, 1825,
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Before the projected meeting between Clay and Adams had taken
place, George Robertson, a former member of the House from Kentucky, and
at the time a member of the legislature frcrni that State, wrote Adams a
letter, dated January 6 and delivered to Adams on January 21 by Letcher»
The letter stated that the Kentucky legislature had decided to adv^be
their congressional delegation to vote for Jackson, Robertson analyzed
some of the reasons for the decision, referring to the leaders of the
movement as "offIce-hunters," and saying that they were supporting
Jackson in anticipation of political reward.

After observing that "men

who will

regulate public sentiment"in Kentucky were against Jackson,

and that

the vote had been intendedto "humble and paralyze" Clay,

Robertson advised Adams that he could still get the support of Kentucky
and win.
If all things be managed discreetly and judiciously „ » , all
depends on yourselfg_ I know you may succeed. And if I were
in the Arena would |~~QnsureT] the vote of my state, I know
how it could be done. If you loose thy fear thy will loose
Ohio, Mr, Letcher is my friend and confidant — he is dis
posed to be yours == there is no man in whom you can confide
with more safety. You may communicate with him fully and
unreservedly on any subject connect with the great object —
more so than any one man , „ , he is remarkable for his dis
cretion and his good common sense —= he understands men as
well as any one of his age == , , , He may be able to render
you service — and I assure you that there will be not the
remotest hazard in making of him the depository of your feel
ings and views in relation to the Presidency — you will know
how to appreciate ray brashness. The occasion will not allow
a , , , disguise — I am extremely desirous for your success —
and cannot conveniently, with my opinion of duty, milt anything
in my power which may lend, in any degree, to promote the ob
ject , , ,
&0"Letters Received and other Loose Papers,"
January 6, 182^,

cit,, reel k67,
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On January 9 Henry Clay visited Adams at home, and spent the
evening in *®a long conversation explanatory of the past and prospective
of the future,”® According to Adams’ "Diary®®;
[~~Clay~l said that the time was drawing near when the choice
must be made in the House of Representatives of a President
from the three candidates presented by the electoral colleges.
That o , , the time had now come, at which he might be expli
cit in his communication with me, and he had for that purpose
asked this confidential interview -= He wished me as far as I
might think proper to satisfy him with regard to some prin
ciples of great public importance, but without any personal
considerations for himself — in the Question to come before
the House, between General Jackson, Mr, Crawford and myself,
he had no hesitation in saying that his preference would be
for me,°^
Clay announced his intention of supporting Adams on January 2U.
The announcement resulted in ®®a very high state of excitement in the
fiP
House,®®
¥ith Clay and "the majority of the Ohio and Kentucky delega
tions having yesterday unequivocally avowing®® their determination to vote
for Adams, "the impression almost universal , „ . was that the election
was settled®' in Adams’ favor, Adams, however, anticipated the ordeal
that now awaited him, and in his "diary*® for January 2$, he observed?
*’my situation will be difficult and trying beyond ny powers of expres
sion — may but my strength be proportioned to my trials,
Both Letcher and Clay expressed a wish for another meeting with
Adams, and set January 28 as the date,^^ Adams waited all evening at
ôlutpiary,®®
cit,, reel 39» January 1, 1625, Here the *®diary"
entry for that day breaks off in the middle of the page, to resume again
(In that particular volume) on Wednesday, June 26, 1828,
"Diary in Abridgement, ' o£, cit,, reel 36, January 2h, 1825,
^\bid,, January 25, 1825,
^^Ibid„, January 27, 1825,
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home alone, eacpecting Clay to call, but he failed to appearo^^ The fol
lowing evening, however, Clay accon^anied Adams home after a dinner at
George Sullivan's, and the two spent a two-hour visit discussing ™all
the prospects and probabilities of the Presidential election»** Adams
reported that Clays
spoke » » . with the utmost freedom of men and things. [jîi]
intimated doubts and prepossessions concerning individual
friends of mine, to all which I listened with due considera
tion. He was anxious for the conciliation of Webster and
Louis McLane, and expressed some jealousy as from Webster, of
the persons by whom he supposed me to be surrounded . . . his
own situation is difficult and critical. He is attacked with
fury in the newspapers for having come out for me, and threats
of violence have been largely thrown out by the partizans of
General Jackson. . . this blustering has an air of despera
tion — but we must meet it.°°
After Clay's announcement that he intended to support Adams, both
men were subjected to warnings and criticisms.

In one letter from an

anonymous **friend** in Philadelphia, Adams was warned that Clay's support
of Adams would result in a civil war at worst, and four years of misery
for Adams at best, stressing that Adams could succeed Jackson in four
years if he supported the “Old Hero®* aow.^"^ And Edward Patchell^®
appealed to Adams to step down rather than to “crawl into the Presi
dential chair through the base intrigue of corrupt politicians.*®^^
^^Ibld., January 28, l82$.
^^Ibid., January 29, 182$.
“Letters Received and other Loose Papers,*® op. cit., reel I4.
67,
January 27, 182$.
^®John Spencer Bassett calls Patchell ®*an ignorant preacher
leader of the Jackson merfTn Pennsylvania"] . . . editor of the Alle=
ghany Democrat.*® (John Spencer Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson, (New
York, 1916), p. 133.
^^*®Letters Received and other Loose Papers,®* 0£. cit., reel U67,
January 27, l82$.
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George Kremer's letter charging Clay and Adams with a “corrupt bargain”
appeared in the Colombian Observer, as well as Clay's card challenging
Kremer, which appeared in the National I n t e l l i g e n e e r On February 3,
Clay “called upon the House to institute an investigation.

Kremer did

the same, and a debate ensued upon it in the House.
By this time, the seriousness of the political situation was be-=
coming increasingly apparent to Adams. He suddenly decided that he did
not want the presidency after all.

In his “diary“ for February 2, he

remarked?
To me the alternatives are both distressing in prospect, and the
most formidable is that of success. All the danger is on the
pinnacle. The humiliation of failure will
be somuch more than
compensated by the safety in which it will
leaveme, that I
ought to regard it as a consummation devoutly to be wished and
hoped to find consolation in it.
As the pressure began to build up in the wake of the “corrupt
bargain” accusation, Adams seemed also to have been desperately trying
to convince people that he had not and would not bargain.

He requested

Daniel P. Cook to put in writing the “corrupt offer” Ingham and McDuffie
had made him. And he delivered to James Monroe a letter “upon the sub
ject

of nominations to the foreign missions; and toldhim that T" he I

wished to put it as a deposit in his hands, for a testimonial thatT~ hè^
had not used those missions to promote any purpose of^^his^] own.”
^^he original card written by Clay is included in the Adams
papers with a note from Charles Francis Adams eacplaining that the original
card came from the papers of “Mr. Seaton, ©f Boston.” (Ibid., January 31,
1825.)
71
“Diary in Abridgement,“
--dt., reel 36, February 3, 1825.
72
Ibid., February 2, 1825.
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Monroe accepted the letter, said he would not cmmmnicate it to any one,
and remarked that he was aware of the extreme circumspection with which
it was necessary for Adams to act.?^
Monroe had apparently decided to make the nominations for foreign
missions on January 31o When Adams was advised of this fact by George
Sullivan, he immediately went to Monroe and found Calhoun and Secretary
of the Navy Samuel L» Southard with him»

After Calhoun and Southard

left, Monroe told Adams that he intended to make the appointments at
once, upon the advice of Calhoun and Southard.

Adams said that he would

be willing to have Monroe make the nominations at once also, but that in
the face of the approaching election, such a step would “increase the
excitement already great and every day flaming.“ Adams reasoned that
Calhoun and Southard had urged Monroe to make the nominations immediately
to keep Adams from using them as lures to promote his own election in
the H o u s e O n the following day, February 1, Adams again called on
Monroe, who announced that he had decided not to make the nominations
after all, but rather to leave them to his successor. Adams, in his
Diary, “ attributed Monroe“s decision to the influence of Ingham, who
had visited Monroe that m o r n i n g . B u t Adams needed further assurance,
and returned the next morning to ask Monroe to verify his decision of
the previous day. When Monroe confirmed this, Adams said that he had
originally understood that Monroe had been considering the alternatives
“^^Ibid., February U, 182^.
^\bid., January 31, 1825.
75
Ibid., February 1, 1825.
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of making the appointments before or after the House election, not of
leaving them to his suceessoro

Adams then informed Monroe that he wished

him to make the nominations before the election, rather than not at all,
because by doing so he would keep the rumor from circulating that the
posts were being held out as rewards for political support.

Adams

observed that %nong the candidates that rMonroel had mentioned to me,
were two members of Congress, one holding, the other supposed to influ=
ence votes <==> it would be difficult for the successor to nominate either
of them, especially if the votes in question should be for him.

Then,

when Adams called on Monroe on February k with the letter certifying that
he did not want to use the offices for political purposes, Monroe ex=
plained his own position by pointing out that he had decided not to make
the nominations at all, but to leave them to his successor, because “that
operating equally upon both could not be attributed to the influence of
either.
The evidence is overv^elraing that Adams feared falling into the
political maelstrom created by the “corrupt bargain" charge.

He asked

George Sullivan if he would be willing to “testify . . . in a court of
justice" with regard to a conversation with Calhoun, in which Calhoun
made the remark that if Clay were appointed Secretary of State by Adams
a determined opposition to the administration would be immediately organized under the banner of General Jackson.7® General Brown certainly
7^Ibid., February 2, 1825.
77
Ibid., February h, 1825.
*7R
Ibid., February 11, 1825.
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realized the aeriousness of the charge idiem he pleaded with Adams not to
appoint Clay as Secretary of State.79 And Robert Walsh, editor of the
Philadelphia National Gazette, in a letter of February 1? to Alexander N«
Everett,®® observed that “with regard to Clay, I do not think that he
can accept now, of any appointment after all the noises made about bar8l
gains.“
Finally, James Gallatin, son of former Secretary of the
Treasury Albert Gallatin, explained to Adams why his father could not
take the same post in Adams* administration. Young Gallatin reasoned
that his father refused the post because if he had accepted it “ he would
have been subjected to the same surmises, to which Mr. Clay has been, by
the circumstances of that gentleman's accepting one of the departments.
On February 10, Adams first told Southard that he would appoint
Clay as Secretary of S t a t e . T h e following day Adams informed Monroe
that the reason for the appointment was Clay's “talents and services —
to the western section of the Union, whence he comes, and to the confi
dence in me, manifested by their delegations,
In contrast to the apprehensive Adams, Clay “made light of the
79Ibid., February 12, 1825.
^^Bemis identifies Everett as "Adams's friend and protege
of Boston, brother to Edward Everett fT later^ minister to Spain
later to become brother-in-law to the President^Adams'^ daughter-inlaw, Abigail Brooks Adams, wife of Charles Francis Adams," (Bemis, op.
cit., p. 22),
“Letters Received and other Loose Papers," o£„ cit., reel i|67,
February 17, 1825.
ft?
Ibid., March 2, 1825.
83
"Diary in Abridgement," C£. cit., reel 36, February 10, 1825.
^\bid., February 11, 1825.
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threatened opposition, and thought all the projects of that nature which
have been announced were mere ebullitions of disappointment at the issue
of the election, which would soon be abandoned."

Clay then went on to

add that had the investigation of the "bargain" charge gone to the House,
he. Clay, could have proved that a conspiracy had existed against him.
Clay then claimed that Kremer had even been willing to sign an apology to
Clay =“ until Ingham, McDuffie, and James Buchanan had convinced him not

to do so«

85

And in another meeting with Adams on February 27, Clay again

predicted that the attempts of Ingham and McDuffie to use Kremer would
backfire, and stated that he had been approached by Jackson's and Crawford's backers also, with offers of "bargains," Clay seemed confident
that there would be no opposition to his nomination in the Senate, or at
most, only token opposition.®^
When the list of nominations suggested by Adams was presented to
the Senate on March 7, all were approved without opposition, except for
Clay's, to which there were several "nays," including Jackson's,

But

where the master politician, Henry Clay, had underestimated the strength
and importance of such token opposition, the naive Puritan, John Quincy
Adams, realized its true significance.

He remarked in his "diary" that

"this was the first act of the opposition from the stump which is to be
carried on against the Administration under the banners of General Jackson.'.87
85.Ibid., February 12, 1825
6

^^Ibid., February 27, 1825.
8-7
Ibid., March 7, 1825.
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Such is the evidence in the Adams manuscripts which throws light
on the “corrupt bargain“ controversy.

How far does this evidence go in

answering the three critical questions which were posed at the beginning
of the chapter?
The first and oldest historical interpretation indicated that
Adams was a moralistic Puritan, one of the last of the old school of Revo
lutionary statesmen, who was not even capable of campaigning in the modern
demagogic manner then coming into fashion, not to mention entering into
“corrupt“ negotiations with Clay to further his own political interests.
According to this view, this upright statesman was led by his own honesty
and political naivete to commit a blunder which allowed him to be placed
at the mercy of the slanderous pro-Jackson and pro-Crawford demagogues
in the greatest political “frame-up“ in American history, and one which
eventually destroyed his and Clay's political fortunes.
As this thesis proves, however, in spite of Adams' repeated pro
testations of innocence, he was not only capable of, but did actively
engage in, political negotiations with various political figures in key
positions in the period preceding the House election.

The extended con

versations with Scott of Missouri and the ex-Federalists led by "Webster,
corroborates this fact beyond a shadow of doubt.

True, Adams was appar

ently a religious and moral man, undoubtedly more moral than the typical
political figure in that era of growing “democracy.“

Still, he was by

training a diplomat as much as a moralistic Puritan, and this facet of
his character came to the fore in 182U and 182$,
Nor, after examining the Adams papers, can this writer conclude
that Adams was as naive as “traditional® historians claim.

The letters
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from Tallma%s^ Degrand, Warren, and especially Robertson of Kentucky,
advising Adams to trust Letcher, would have been tom up in righteous
indignation by anyone as moral as the traditionalist historians have
pictured Adams. Adams knew ■what he was doing, as the "Incedo super
ignes** entry in his "diary™ for December 23 indicates.

Indeed, Adams

was apparently more aware of the political whirlwind which he was brew
ing than was Clay, who until the end kept predicting that the threatened
opposition would never materialize.
It is revealing to notice how Adams desperately tried to con
vince not only his contemporaries but posterity that he was an honest
man — iby requesting Cook's statement for history; by presenting the
letter to Monroe certifying that he was not using the foreign appoint
ments for political gain; and by telling George Sullivan that he would
expect him to be willing to testify that the Calhounites were planning
to wreck Adams' administration by planned opposition. As the pressure
from the “bargain™ charge began to build up, Adams' entries in the
“Diary" become more and more guarded.

Finally, any doubt that Adams

knew what he was doing can be dispelled by a careful reading of the
"Macbeth Policy,® in which Adams clearly reveals the alternatives fac
ing the presidential hopeful who is contemplating cultivating political
"friendships.®
The second historical view, in which Adams is seen as the mor
alist whose code gradually breaks down in the face of political ambi
tion, would seem to be the most accurate, when the evidence in the Adams
manuscripts is considered.

His avowed determination not to '^bargain,"

stated so dogmatically in "The Macbeth Policy," in January, 1823, had by
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late I82U been modified to the point where Adams was willing to enter into
extended negotiations with Scott, Cook, Letcher, Van Rensselaer, and other
members of the Honse with the obvious objective of gaining their support
in the approaching elections by making concessions of a political nature„
And by February, 182^, Adams' previous position had been altered to the
point where he was willing to promise the appointment of a judge (if not
a cabinet member) to gain the support of the ex-Federalists. This gradual
process of "moral evolution™ continued until it was dramatically reversed
by the "corrupt bargain™ charge, in the face of which Adams suddenly be
comes the righteous statesman once again, whose composure is only slightly
weakened by his demands that people sign affidavits certifying that he is
indeed honest. Perhaps the very moral attitude that Adams throughout his
entire administration (and which is used by "traditional" historians to
prove his moral character), can be explained by the fact that the only
time he let his conscience slip he suffered for it, and so determined
to keep to the “moral" path from that time forward.
The final question posed is the practical and realistic one —
did Adams and Clay reach an agreement which led to Clay's support of
Adams in the House election and Clay's subsequent appointment as Sec
retary of State?

There are obvious gaps in the Adams papers in the

areas which contain information pertaining to this question.®^ The
very fact that these gaps exist in the "Diaries" and correspondence
might indicate that Adams was trying to hide something; but it is very
difficult to prove guilt because of these omissions. Probably the
00

See "appendix," p. 102.
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closest thing to a direct admission by Adams that a "comipt bargain"
did exist can be found in the entry in his "Diary*' for February 11^ 1825»
Here Adams recorded having notified Monroe that the reason he appointed
Clay was because of Clay's “talents and services -= to the western section
of the Union, whence he comes, and to the confidence in me manifested by
their delegations.**®^ In other words, Adams says that he appointed Clay
because Clay's western friends in the House voted for him. Nomhere in"
the Adams Papers is there evidence that Adams told Clay before the elec
tion that he would be appointed Secretary of State because of this support,
although another entry in the "Diary" indicates that he hinted as much to
John Scott.

In a conversation with Scott, when asked whether Clay would

be made a member of the new administration, Adams replied?

"If I should

be elected by the suffrages of the West, I should naturally l.ok to the
West for much of the support that I should need."^^ The statement satis
fied Scott, but not later historians.
An examination of the role played by Adams in the election of
I82U reveals an unfolding drama that in many respects resembles the
"tragedy** predicted by Adams himself two years previously in the "Macbeth
Policy.*“ Adams, not Monroe, was the last of the great statesmen trained
in the ideals of the Revolutionary period.

Unlike the others, he lived

on into a different era, into the period of the "rise of the common man,"
when mere excellence did not assure political favor, when “courting the
masses** became the essential ingredient for political success.

Adams

®^'Diary in Abridgement," £p. cit., reel 36, February 11, 1825,
^^Ibid., January 21, 1825.
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could not lower himself to enter the political arena and utilize the
tactics of the common demagogue^ the closest he could come was to
enter a "bargain** with Clay which seems harmless when measured hy the
standards of political conduct of a later era»

APPENDIX AND NOTES ON THE ADAlffi PAPERS
Close and careful analysis of John Quincy Adams* "Diary" in its
original form on Microfilm is made very difficult by the disordered con=
dition of the original» Adams kept not one but three "Diaries" much of
the time?

a short ““Line-a-day Diary," a longer "Diary, " and finally, a

"Diary in Abridgement," •which, instead of being "abridged," is actually
much longer in many entries than the other two»
Taking into consideration only the period from December 1, 182U
(after the electors had been selected, but before they had voted), to
March U, 1825 (the date Adams was inaugurated), we find fragments of the
"Diary" appearing in at least five separate volumes.

The entries for

December 1 through January lii are entered in a volume entitled "Rubbish,™
which also includes much unrelated miscellaneous material; the entries
for January 1 through January 9 are included in the short "Line-a=day
Diary," as well as in the regular "Diary" in a separate volume. From
January 15 through February 16, the entries are in the "Diary in Abridge
ment," but the ““Line-a-day Diary" includes entries for this period also.
There is a complete gap in boJn the "Diary in Abridgement" and "the short
"Diary™ for the period beginning February 1? and ending February 21 =<=
for this period the observer must seek information in the ™Dine-a«day
Diary. " The "Diary in Abridgement" resumes with the February 21 entry,
and continues through the inauguration.
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10il
John Qriincy Adams himself, in a ’"'pocket memorandum book,

lists

the ™Diaries“ which together comprise the •’Diary*' of Charles Francis
Adams® Memoirs, In this list, John Quincy lists ten separate volumes and
one "small, leather-covered book" as including the "Diary*’ entries from
June 3, I79U to June 2^, 1828»

Considering only the period under discus

sion in this paper, we find that he indicates that entries up to February
16, 1825 are in "Vol» 9," and entries for January 1 through January 9 are
included in "Vol» 10»" Whether the "Line-a-day" entries are included
in this account is not indicated»
While the correspondence and miscellaneous material in the other
Adams Papers has been arranged for the most part in chronological order,
which makes it much easier to examine than the "Diaries," there are still
problems encountered»

For exairqsle, the statement from Daniel ?» Cook per

taining to his conversation with Ingham, McDuffie, and Issacs appears
unsigned and dated "January 21, 1825" in the Adams Papers»^^ The date
on the statement discusses, not the date it was written» Another dating
problem presents itself in the "Diary in Abridgement»"

This journal was

obviously written sometime after the events it describes took placej yet
the dates of the events depicted, and not the dates when the events took
place appear in it»
As has been previously mentioned, there seems to be very little
^^John Quincy Adams, "Miscellany," The Adams Papers Part III,
reel number 20i|o
92

"Miscellany," ot» cit», reel number 256» The statement also
appears in reel number iiS? (Letters Received and other Loose Papers,")
with the name "D» P» Cook" dubbed in and "Cook, D» P» 21 Jan 1825" written
at the top of the third page in what appears to be John Quincy Adams®
handwriting»
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evidence of bias in the Memoirs for the period under consideration.

Any

thing detrimental to the Adams interests seems to be faithfully included
in the text, with the only changes made apparently to eliminate "unimpor
tant" information (such as the lists of the guests at dinner parties and
the names of the plays attended by Adams), or to modernize spelling and
punctuation to make the material more readable.

The only changes in

wording that might also result in changes in meaning occur in the Memoirs
for January 9 and 29, 1825.

In the former entry, Adams reported that

Clay said Adams' friends had appealed to Clay repeatedly to support their
candidate, "directly or indirectly urging considerations personal to him
self as motives to his cause „ „ ."93 in the original document, there
seems to be little doubt that the word "cause" was really "course.
And in the latter entry, Adams, in another conversation with Clay is
reported in the Memoirs as having told Clay of "the sources of Webster's
anxieties, and my own earnest desire to conciliate him."^^ The word
"sources" in the original is written "source.
As we have seen, Samuel Flagg Bemis attaches a great deal of
importance to the gap which appears in the original "Diary" following
Adams' description of his crucial talk with Clay on January 9.^^ And
it is at this gap in the Memoirs where Charles Francis Adams inserted
93
Memoirs, op. cit., vol.
9k
«Diary,"
cit., reel
95
Memoirs, op. cit.., vol.
96
«Diary in Abridgement,"
97
Bemis,
c^,, p. UO.

vi, p. liôU.
39, January 9, l825<
vi, p. U83.
c^„ cit., p. UO.
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his celebrated footnote to explain why the entry for that day had not been
completed8
This appears to have been intended for a full report, which the
extreme pressure of business and visits subsequently prevented
the writer from completing. Long lists of persona calling
daily, with their respective wished, still remain, but they
scarcely retain interest enough to merit the space they would
occupy in these pages,'*98
Charles Francis has failed to mention, however, that these "long lists
of persona calling" are not included in the same volume as the January 9
entry. And neither does he try to explain why the "Diary in Abridgement,"
(which had to be written later, when the "pressure of business and visits"
lessened), begins with the entry for January 1$, and not January 9.
Examination of the original volumes which make up the "Diary" of
the Memoirs for this critical date reveals that the gap of January 9 is
merely one of several similar gaps that appear from time to time during
the period.
Diary,

Indeed, this gap is not a gap at all in the "Line=a=day

"99 and the "Rubbish" v o l u m e . A much more significant gap,

from length of omission, at least, is found between February 17 and
February 21, when the only record is found in the "Line-a-day Diary."^^1
Thus it would seem that any attempt to reconstruct what occurred during
this critical juncture in American history by what does not appear in
these manuscripts rather than by what does appear would seem t,o be a dif
ficult undertaking. The gaps which assume so much significance in the
98
Memoirs, op. cit., vol. vi, p. U6^o
99
"Diary," 0£. cit., reel 26, January 9, 182$.
100

"Rubbish," D£. cn., reel $1, January 9, 182$.
"Diary," 0£. cU., reel 26, February 17, 182$.
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accounts of some contemporary historians do not appear to be so unnatural
in the original context as they seem in the Memoirs »
To further complicate an already complex situation, the Memoirs
have gaps where none exist in the manuscripts.

For example, in the

period under discussion, material is omitted from the entries in the
Memoirs for December 18, January 1, January 9, January 10, January 22,
February 8, February 21, and February 22.

There seems to be little

reason for these omissions in the Memoirs, other than that Charles
Francis Adams apparently felt this material to be of so little histori
cal importance that its inclusion could not be justified.
omissions are just a few words in length.

Most of these

The exceptions are seventy-

six lines which were cut from the December 18 entry in the original
"Diary;Ml02 g^d entries for January 10,103 February 21, and February

22,10U which are not in the Memoirs, although they appear in the origi
nal manuscripts.
Perhaps the most interesting document in the whole collection to
those historians who prefer to "read between the lines" of the Adams
Papers is the previously-mentioned letter of December 10, I838, in which
Albert H, Tracy asked John Quincy Adams to clarify some of the events
which took place in December, 182U and January, 182$.

Adams apparently

never answered the letter,10$ perhaps because Tracy's stated objective
102"(Rubbish,"

cit., reel $1, December 18, 182U.

103ibid., January 10, 182$.
lO^iiDiary in Abridgement,"
lO^Bemis, op. cit., p. Uo<

cit., reel 36, February 16, 182$<
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in asking the questions was to obtain answers which would serve as "a
gratifying memorial to posterity." In the letter, Tracy asked?
Another matter which I shall be happy for you to verify is the
conversation had with you by Mr. Clay at his first interview
when he announced his determination to support your election.
It occurred at your house, where I happehed to come the moment
Mr, Clay left, and you then repeated to me, with verbal accuracy
I have no doubt, what had just passed between you.^06
This is the same Tracy, who, upon the day of the Adams-Clay meeting, was
"speculating upon the approaching

election

[. . . without conclusive

materials for j u d g e m e n t , b u t whose speculations, while "less flatter
ing," were "generally more correct than those of most others" who dis
cussed the then-approaching election with

A d a m s .

Apparently Tracy was speculating lU years later, still "without
conclusive materials for judgement," just as are so many American his
torians .

lObnLetters Received and other Locee Papers," o£. cit., reel
510, December 10, 1838.
lOTsiDiary," o£. cit., reel 39, January 9, 1825.
^°®Ibid., January 2, 1825.
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